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Executive Summary  In this report, a fire protection and fire hazard analysis has been performed on a semi-conductor facility, abbreviated as the Fab, located on Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New Mexico. The Fab is part of the MESA complex which is operated by the NTESS corporation for the Department of Energy (DOE) at Sandia National Laboratories.  The prescriptive analysis of this report addresses the various fire protection systems in the facility such as fire suppression, and fire alarm. The prescriptive analysis is based on national codes and standards from the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) and from the International Code Council (ICC). Specific and unique requirements also stem from Sandia National Laboratories specifications and from the DOE orders and standards. The performance based section of this report analyzes two fire scenarios which were selected based upon current operations in the facility and the possibility (greater than 0%) of both scenarios occurring. These two fire scenarios compare the same situation with and without sprinklers. The design fire basis is based on lab coats and other gowning items stored in the corridor. The concern is that if the lab coats were to catch on fire, the integrity of the corridor as an egress path might be compromised. Through fire modeling and widely accepted tenability criteria, it was shown that the concern is valid and that a lab coat fire presents a significant challenge for the facility.  The results of this report indicate that an exit should be added to the exterior in RM 1919, the hydraulic calculations for the facility should be reconstituted and the gowning operations should be moved from the tour aisle into the fabrication area.           
Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab) 
 
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017   4 
 
Acknowledgements  I’d like to first thank Sandia Corporation and the managers I’ve had, Perry D’Antonio and Julie Cordero, for supporting me in completing this degree. Coming to Sandia laboratories when I started this degree program helped me learn a lot about fire protection as I learned about the labs and the unique facilities and fire protection challenges here. Through Lockheed Martin and now NTESS, I’ve received financial support for this endeavor for which I am truly thankful for. I am proud to work for companies which hold education so highly regarded.  Secondly, I’d like to acknowledge and thank my Sandia coworkers who are Cal Poly alumni of the program. Alice Muna, Perry D’Antonio, Tomas Sanchez, Josh Herrera, and Mo Mosallaei. Through watching their culminating project presentations and reading their reports I gained much wisdom for the program. Many of them also gave me feedback during my FPE 596 practice presentations. I’ve also been working through the program at the same time as Nolan Baker (also scheduled to graduate in Spring 2017) so I’m grateful for having him to discuss lectures with when we’ve had the same courses.  I would also be remiss without thanking all the professors of the classes. I think the Cal Poly program is a great one for working professionals like myself. I’d also especially like to thank Dr. Pascual and Dr. Mowrer for being so prompt in responding to me when I had questions about the program or during the many classes that they taught.  Finally, and most importantly I’d like to thank my family for all the support they’ve offered to me throughout the two and a half years that this program has taken. I’d especially like to thank my daughter who is now six and has spared me enough play time with her to complete the coursework and listen to the lectures at home and on the weekends. What are we going to do next? We’re going to Disneyland!   
 
 
 
Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab) 
 
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017   5 
 
Commonly Used Acronyms in the Report 
 
CAD – Computer Assisted Drafting 
CO – Carbon Monoxide 
DOE – Department of Energy 
DBA – Decibels Adjusted 
FACP – Fire Alarm Control Panel (legacy is to refer to them as DGPs or Data Gathering Panels) 
FDS – Fire Dynamics Simulator 
GPM – Gallons per Minute 
HPMs – Hazardous Production Materials 
HRR – Heat Release Rate  
IBC – International Building Code 
IFC – International Fire Code 
ITM – Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance  
KAFB – Kirtland Air Force Base 
LSC – Life Safety Code (NFPA 101) 
MESA - Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) complex 
NFPA – National Fire Protection Association 
SFPE – Society of Fire Protection Engineers  
SNL – Sandia National Laboratories 
The Fab – The fabrication facility being analyzed also known as the Microelectronics Development 
Laboratory  
UBC – Uniform Building Code (Precursor to the IBC and the code of record for the subject facility) 
USSD – Ultra Sensitive Smoke Detection  
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PROJECT BUILDING: SNL Fab Facility 1.0 Introduction  1.1 General Report Description 
This report is my culminating project of the California Polytechnic University’s Fire Science Master’s 
program. In this report, I will address the prescriptive fire protection requirements of my selected project 
building along with fire scenarios I’ve selected for a performance based fire protection analysis. The report 
is broken up such that a general introduction will give basic background information on the facility, 
followed by the prescriptive requirement analysis, then a performance based analysis and finally a 
recommendations and conclusion section. 1.2 General Facility Description 
The microelectronics development laboratory (MDL), also called the fabrication facility (Fab), and 
numbered by Sandia Laboratories as building 858 North, is part of a complex of buildings designed for 
both business occupancy, and semiconductor fabrication. These sets of buildings are collectively known 
as the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA) complex. Figure 1 shows the layout of 
the 858 complex. The Fab is one of the two main areas of semiconductor development in the complex. It 
has fabrication areas in its southern section and other support labs and storage areas to the north. It is 
physically located to the North of 858 South which has the office space of the complex and 858EF which 
also handles semiconductor fabrication (albeit in a different fashion than the Fab). Figure 2 shows a 
picture of the exterior of the facility. 858 North aka the Fab is the “inverse T-shaped” space in the NW 
part of MESA. All the four facilities of MESA are physically connected but separated from each other by 
fire barriers or walls. For example, 858 North is separated from 858EF with a double fire-wall but is 
separated from 858 South with only a fire barrier.   
  
Figure 1. Main buildings of the MESA complex. 
858N 
(Fab) 
858S 
858EF 
858EL 
858G 
858J 
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Figure 2. Northside of B858N, the FAB, near the utility section of the facility. 
The 858 complex of buildings is typically called the Microsystems Science and Engineering Complex 
(MESA) complex. The MESA complex has a large number of fire hazards including hazardous production 
materials (HPMs) which are used for semiconductor manufacturing. 858 North has the actual 
semiconductor fabrication area or “fab area” in the southern portion of the facility and the business area 
(offices, small labs) in the northern part of the facility. There are also small buildings near 858 which serve 
functional purposes such as 858G which is a warehouse and 858J which serves as a facilities equipment 
hub for the entire complex. 
The MESA complex is operated as a 24 hour, 5-day production facility which means any loss of production 
can potentially cost millions of dollars. Because of the large demands on the facility and the cost of 
downtime, it’s imperative that building occupants only be evacuated from the facility in case of an actual 
emergency. The facility also has a very large concern with any release of hazardous production gases. 
Therefore, any fire alarm and communication systems must properly interface with the facility’s warning 
system for HPMs. Also, care must be taken to only stop the flow of HPM gases if there is an actual 
emergency for the reasons stated above. Even if occupants remain working in the building, if the flow of 
HPM gases is interrupted, business would be disrupted at a large cost (both financial and in terms of the 
resulting operational downtime).  1.3 Building Location 
The facility is located on Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB) in Albuquerque, New Mexico and is part of the 
Sandia National Laboratories. Sandia National Laboratories is a multi-mission laboratory managed and 
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operated by National Technology and Engineering Solutions of Sandia LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Honeywell International Inc. for the U.S. Department of Energy’s National Nuclear Security 
Administration.  1.4 Building Occupants 
Building occupants include management and a large staff of workers in the fabrication area. See Figure 3 
of a typical worker who might be notified by the facility’s fire alarm system. Because of the nature of the 
fabrication process, evacuating workers in general would be more difficult than regular lab or office 
employees because of the special clothing they wear and due to a possible need to put materials in a safe 
position before exiting a clean room. However, this facility has several different types of alarms including 
a fire alarm. For certain alarms, it is expected that the worker fully de-gowns as normal; however, for a 
fire alarm, they are to immediately exit from the space they are working in even when fully gowned. This 
topic of different facility alarms is further discussed in the fire alarm section of this report. 
 
Figure 3. Picture of a typical worker in the fabrication area. 1.5 Building Layout and Use 
The Fab is a two-story building with a basement. See Figures 4 thru 6 for the layout of each floor. The 
gross square footage of the building is 72,152 square feet and the net square footage is 70,091 square 
feet. The first floor is the main activity floor for the building and contains the semiconductor fabrication 
areas, office space, and general labs. In the fabrication area, there are etching labs, micromachining labs, 
wafer storage areas, and other similar spaces that one would expect to see in a semiconducting facility. 
There are also various chases in the area which house HVAC and similar equipment needed to maintain 
the clean room environment of the area. Based on the layout of the building, there is approximately a 
chase for every clean room.  There is also a gowning area where occupants are expected to put on special 
clean room approved clothing, such as a gown and headwear, over their regular, or “street”, clothes. The 
semiconductor fabrication area is located on the south end of the facility and is separated from the rest 
of the facility by a three-hour rated fire barrier. The south fabrication area is separated from the rest of 
the occupancies (storage and business) by a two-hour rated barrier. See Appendix A for a layout of the 
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fire barriers throughout the first floor. Appendix A-8 shows the numerous exits on the first floor of the 
Fab. 
 
 
 
Figure 4. First floor layout. The up arrow represents true North. 
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Figure 5. Second floor layout. Red circles indicate exits. 
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Figure 6. Basement layout. Red circles indicate exits. 
To the north of the semiconductor fabrication area are the office spaces and general labs. There is also a 
loading dock on the west end of the facility. East of the loading dock are general office spaces and east of 
that is a cluster of storage rooms where the semiconductor hazardous production materials (HPMs) are 
located. There are one-hour fire barriers between the general storage rooms (S occupancy per IBC), office 
spaces (B occupancy per IBC), and HPM storage rooms (H-5 occupancy per IBC).  
The second floor is generally used for storage and catwalks overlooking the labs. The second-floor storage 
rooms are for ordinary storage; that is no hazardous material storage.  There is also a shop area on the 
second floor. There is no fire rated separation between floors of this facility. 
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Overall, there is a lot of construction work currently occurring the building. New egress doors are being 
added which will slightly change the means of egress analysis (see Figure 7). Several existing barriers 
also had to be adequately fire calked to maintain their rating. The CAD files for this facility and life safety 
plans for this building will need to be as-built after this project is complete.  
  
Figure 7. New project in corridor to add door (left) and seal fire barrier penetrations (right) 2 Prescriptive Egress Requirements 
This section focuses with how the Fab satisfies prescriptive code requirements from the 2015 IBC and the 
2015 LSC.  Note that the original code of record for the Fab was the 1985 Uniform Building Code or UBC 
which was the precursor for the International Building Code.  Code requirements such as allowable travel 
distance, dead ends, and occupant loads will be discussed in this section. Specialty codes such as NFPA 
318 will also be discussed since semiconductor facilities have unique more restrictive requirements that 
go beyond those from the IBC and LSC.  2.1 Occupancy Classifications 
The first floor of the Fab is the primary floor of the building and is typically occupied. The second floor is 
mostly a catwalk area to overlook the lab and general storage space and is typically unoccupied or 
occupied for only short intervals (such as to store/retrieve materials or oversee operations of the labs 
below). The basement is for large equipment serving the first floor and is typically unoccupied except for 
maintenance performing work. Also since the floor between the first floor and basement is not fire rated, 
the basement is considered the same occupancy as the first floor above it. This means that the basement 
is the more stringent H-5/industrial occupancy and not the typical classification of a mechanical room 
utility space. The IBC does not allow an occupied H-5 floor below grade (IBC section 415). Therefore, no 
occupant load is assigned to the basement using NFPA 101. However, if the IBC were to be used for the 
basement then the basement would be categorized as a group “U” (miscellaneous) occupancy. Note that 
a group U occupancy in the IBC does not require a lot of the fire protection features such as sprinkler 
coverage that would be required of an occupied classification (e.g. “B”). 
The most important occupancy classification to note in this facility is semiconductor fabrication area which 
falls under the H-5 occupancy class (High Hazard – semiconductor) of the 2015 IBC and the Industrial-
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General classification of the 2015 LSC.  Interestingly while the classification of a semiconductor fabrication 
area is clear in the IBC (it has its own category), it is not so for the 2012 LSC. While one might logically 
assume that the area would be an industrial use per Table 7.3.1.2, the question becomes which one? Is it 
general and high purpose industrial? Is it special purpose industrial? What do those terms really mean? 
The answer lies in chapter 40 of the LSC which is the industrial occupancy chapter and also in another 
NFPA code, written specifically for a semiconductor fabrication facility. Chapter 40 defines the three 
different groups of industrial occupancies. General industrial occupancy is for ordinary and low hazard 
occupancy operations. Special purpose occupancies are the same as general industrial ones except that 
these are characterized by having a low density of human occupancy; that is the majority of the space is 
taken up by machinery and/or equipment. High hazard industrial occupancies differ from the other two 
because of their use of high hazard materials. 
So then the question becomes which one of these definitions does a semiconductor facility fall under? 
One might intuitively think that a semiconductor facility would be a high hazard industrial occupancy 
because of the hazard production materials (HPMs) that are used for semiconductor production. These 
hazardous materials include silane gas which has a maximum flammability rating of “4” on the NFPA 704 
diamond. 
However, a semiconducting fabrication area does not fall under the high hazard industrial occupancy 
classification if one looks at NFPA 318 (2015 edition), Standard for the Protection of Fabrication Facilities. 
Per NFPA 318 paragraph 4.2, “semiconductor manufacturing facilities…shall be considered general-or-
special purpose industrial occupancies as defined in NFPA 101, Life Safety Code.” This is probably since 
HPMS are only used sparingly in semiconductor production spaces (usually small cleanrooms) and that 
another provision of NFPA 318 specifies that the tools in a clean room shall be constructed of 
noncombustible materials or they have to be provided with internal fire detection and suppression.  
Note that the southern part of the facility is all marked as a group H-5 (per IBC) or general-industrial 
occupancy even though that area includes spaces such as restrooms, and general labs that would normally 
be marked as a business occupancy. The reason for this is that there is no fire separation in the entire 
southern part of the facility which means that all the area must be considered the same occupancy as the 
semiconductor fabrication labs because the required fire separation from either the IBC or LSC is not 
present. Also note that the HPM storage rooms to the north of the fabrication area have a high hazards 
industrial occupancy classification because the same materials are stored in there that are used in the labs 
but in a larger space than the small individual labs which presents more of a fire protection issue. The risk 
mitigating fire protection features of the fabrications labs, such as non-combustible tools or an extra fire 
suppression system, is also not present in the storage area. The HPM storage areas also have a fire 
separation between them and the adjacent business occupancy to the west.  
Appendix A contains scanned color-coded markings of each floor plan which represent their occupancy 
class. Note that equivalent IBC classifications are noted. Overall it was observed that IBC has more specific 
occupancy classifications than the Life Safety Code (LSC). An example is the IBC having 5 hazard categories 
(H-1 thru H-5) available for the storage and use of hazardous materials while the LSC doesn’t have specific 
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hazard categories. Yet another example is that the IBC has a specific category for miscellaneous and 
equipment space while the LSC does not.  2.2 Occupant Loads 
Occupant load calculations for both the first and second floor are shown in Table A.1. Most occupants 
reside on the first floor. Some occupants reside on the second floor, mainly in a small shop area (see Figure 
8). The majority of the second floor is not occupied and taken up by catwalks overlooking the labs. Note 
that this is not an atrium since the labs (fabrication areas) are enclosed by ceilings; hence the requirement 
for them to be clean rooms.  No occupancy analysis was performed on the basement because this space 
is only occupied by maintenance or if some construction work is being performed. Even though the 
basement is a large space, it is mostly filled with equipment serving the fabrication area. See Figure 9 for 
a picture of the basement. 
 
Figure 8. Second floor. Small row of storage areas and a shop at the end. 
 
Figure 9. Basement. Note the large amount of equipment. 
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2.3 Exit Capacity 
The LSC and IBC are both similar in which factors they use to determine the exit capacity of a means of 
egress component such as a door or stair. In the LSC, these factors are called capacitor factors and they 
can be found in Table 7.3.3.1. For the Fab, the two types of means of egress components used are the 
stairs, which are located in the northern part of the building on the other side of a fire barrier with the 
fabrication area, and numerous doors leading to the exterior. There is one exit door that is considered 
high hazard, which is the exit door from the HPM storage area. Table 1 shows the exit capacity for the first 
and second floors. Note the numerous exits of the facility shown in the appendix Figure A-8. Figure 10 
shows an exterior view of the numerous emergency exits on the south wall of the Fab. The red tubes are 
fans meant to maintain laminar flow in each clean room. Each one of them has an arrow showing the 
direction of egress for an occupant once they reach the exterior. 
Table 1. Exit Capacities of the 1st floor of the Fab 
NFPA 101 Table 
7.3.3.1 
     
1st floor 
     
Door Type Quantity Width 
(inches) 
Capacity Factor 
(Width / Person) 
Capacity Each 
(Persons) 
Total Capacity  
by Door Type 
Single Leaf, 
Low/Mod 
Hazard 
18 44 0.2 220 3960 
Single Leaf, 
High Hazard 
1 44 0.4 110 110 
Double Leaf, 
Low/Mod 
Hazard 
5 88 0.2 440 2200 
Double Leaf, 
High Hazard 
1 88 0.2 440 440 
Total: 25 
  
Total Exit 
Capacity 
(persons): 
6,270 
2nd floor 
     
Component 
Type 
Quantity Width 
(inches) 
Capacity Factor 
(Width / Person) 
Capacity Each 
(Persons) 
Total Capacity  
by Door Type 
Stair  1 44 0.3 147 147 
*Single Leaf 
Door 
1 44 0.2 220 220 
* door leads to 
the stair 
   
Total Exit 
Capacity 
(persons): 
147 
Basement 
     
Component 
Type 
Quantity Width 
(inches) 
Capacity Factor 
(Width / Person) 
Capacity Each 
(Persons) 
Total Capacity  
by Door Type 
Stair  1 44 0.3 147 147 
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Double Leaf, 
Low/Mod 
Hazard 
1 88 0.2 440 440 
    
Total Exit 
Capacity 
(persons): 
587 
IBC Table 
1005.1 
     
1st floor 
     
Door Type Quantity Width 
(inches) 
Capacity Factor 
(Width / Person) 
Capacity Each 
(Persons) 
Total Capacity  
by Door Type 
Single Leaf, 
Non-H 
Occupancy 
5 44 0.15 293 1467 
Single Leaf, H 
Occupancy 
14 44 0.2 220 3080 
Double Leaf, H 
Occupancy 
6 88 0.2 440 2640 
Total: 25 
  
Total Exit 
Capacity 
(persons): 
4,547 
2nd floor 
     
Component 
Type 
Quantity Width 
(inches) 
Capacity Factor 
(Width / Person) 
Capacity Each 
(Persons) 
Total Capacity  
by Door Type 
Stair (H 
Occupancy) 
1 44 0.3 147 147 
Single Leaf 
Door (H Occ) 
1 44 0.2 220 220 
    
Total Exit 
Capacity 
(persons): 
147 
Basement 
     
Component 
Type 
Quantity Width 
(inches) 
Capacity Factor 
(Width / Person) 
Capacity Each 
(Persons) 
Total Capacity  
by Door Type 
Stair (H 
Occupancy) 
1 44 0.3 147 147 
Double Leaf, 
Low/Mod 
Hazard (H Occ) 
1 88 0.2 440 440 
    
Total Exit 
Capacity 
(persons): 
587 
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Figure 10. On the left are four emergency exits along the south tour aisle of the Fab. 2.4 Number of exits 
The number of exits is another case of identical requirements between the IBC and LSC. Both (LSC 
paragraph 7.4.1.2 and IBC section 10.15.1.1 state the following with different verbiage: 
• For an occupant load between 500 and 1,000 two exits are required. 
• For an occupant load more than 1,000 four exits are required. 
• For an occupant load less than 500 two exits are required (unless some other special 
conditions are met. 
Per the 2016 version of the IBC, 3 exits are required per story for an occupant load between 500 and 
1,000. Based on the number of exits for the first floor (21 total), adequate exit capacity is easily provided 
for the facility. The second floor also meets the exit requirements of the LSC because paragraph 42.2.4.1 
which allows for a single exit for ordinary hazard storage occupancies which overall the second floor would 
be classified as.  2.5 Arrangement of the Means of Egress 
The Fab has numerous exits along its perimeter. See Figure A-8 for the location of exits on the first floor 
and Figures 5 and 6 for the stair locations on the second floor and basement respectively. These exits are 
emergency exits only and not to be used for occupants leaving the space regularly. See Figure 11 below. 
Once occupants exit from these doors then they can look at arrows on the red fan tubes leading into the 
facility. They also have numerous exit signs hanging in the middle of the corridor to look at. There are also 
some doors which appear that they might be an exit but are not. These doors are properly marked “no 
exit”. 
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Figure 11. Emergency Exit Door of the Fab along South Tour Aisle 
The exit paths are clear of obstructions except for the stairs leading down from the basement which have 
a small personnel gate. See Figure 12. This gate self-latches and an occupant exiting from the basement 
to the first floor pushes this gate. While this gate is not marked with a “no exit” sign, a reasonable 
occupant would not be led to believe that they could exit by going down to the basement.  Therefore, this 
gate is not a concern from an egress standpoint.  
 
Figure 12. Gate leading from the first floor to the basement in the stairwell. 
There are special egress requirements for the HPM storage rooms since they have high hazard content. 
The LSC paragraph 7.11.4 requires two means of egress for these spaces unless ALL of the following criteria 
are met: 
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• Rooms or spaces do not exceed 200𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2. 
• Rooms or spaces have an occupant load not exceeding three persons 
• Rooms or spaces have a travel distance to the room door not exceeding 25 feet. 
In the case of the cluster of HPM storage rooms (rms. 1946, 1950, 1958, and 1964) each one has an area 
greater than 200𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2. Therefore, all four of these rooms are required to have two exits and each one does; 
thus, all the arrangements of egress requirements for the chemical storage area are met.  However, there 
is the acid scrubber room in the NW portion of the facility which does not meet these requirements even 
though it is a high hazard area. Therefore, the Fab does not meet all the provisions of NFPA 101. 2.5.1 Remoteness of Exits 
The LSC has criteria meant to prevent two exits from being located too close to each other. The reasoning 
is that if the exits are too close together, a single fire event could result in the loss of both exits. Paragraph 
7.5.1.3 of the 2012 LSC states, “Remoteness shall be provided in accordance with 4.5.1.3.1 through 
7.5.1.3.7.”  Because the Fab is sprinklered, that leads to LSC paragraph 7.5.1.3.3. which states, “In buildings 
protected throughout by an approved, supervised automatic sprinkler system in accordance with Section 
9.7, the minimum separation distance between two exits, exit accesses, or exit discharges, measured in 
accordance with 7.5.1.3.2, shall be not less than one-third the length of the maximum overall diagonal 
dimension of the building or area being served.” 
This criterion is easily met by the exits on the southern part of the facility. However, if it is assumed that 
the equipment space in the northern half of the facility is occupied, then some of the exits do not meet 
the remoteness criteria (see Figure 13). However, there are sufficient exits for the space even if some of 
the doors are eliminated because they are too close to each other. See Table 2 for egress analysis of the 
utility space. A 113-occupant load requires more than two exits (occupant load more than 49). However, 
there are five for the space and at least two of them meet the remoteness criterion so remoteness is not 
an issue for this space either.  
Note that room 1922 was not considered to be occupied in the egress analysis because it is dedicated 
equipment space. However, if it was considered fully occupied, it is not expected to factor into the egress 
analysis of the rest of the building because of the fact the space has two walls exposed to the exterior of 
the building. And another possible exit path through the adjacent general lab which does not pose a higher 
hazard than room 1922 (thus being allowed as an egress path for room 1922 occupants.) 
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Figure 13. Remoteness criteria in the north equipment room. 
Table 2. Occupant Load of Room 1922 (Equipment): 
Occupancy Classification  Occupant Load Factor  Area (Square Footage) Occupants 
Industrial, General  100 11373 113.73 
 2.5.2 Dead-Ends 
Figure 14 shows the dead ends of the Fab. Per LSC paragraph 38.2.5.2.1 in business occupancies protected 
by an automatic sprinkler system, dead end corridors shall not exceed 50’. The corridor in the northern 
business occupancy end of the building measures at 49’ which is just at the limit allowable.  The second 
dead end path is in the industrial, general use occupancy (the semiconductor fabrication area). It 
measures in at 31.5’. Table 40.2.5 of the LSC allows for a 50’ dead end corridor since the space is sprinkler 
protected so that code criteria are met.  
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Figure 14. Dead end corridors on the first floor of the Fab. 
 2.5.3 Common Path of Travel 
The maximum common path of travel is 100 feet for a business occupancy with a sprinkler system (LSC 
38.2.5.3.1. The maximum common path of travel is 100 feet for a general industrial occupancy with a 
sprinkler system. In both occupancy cases, the maximum common path of travel is not exceeded. The 
same is true for the storage spaces on the second floor which have a maximum common path of travel of 
100 feet for an ordinary hazard storage occupancy. 2.5.4 Travel Distance 
The maximum allowable travel distance requirement from an H-5 occupancy is 200 feet while the 
requirement for a business occupancy with sprinkler protection is 300 feet (per IBC, Table 1016.2). The 
travel distance requirements from the LSC are 250 feet for general industrial occupancy protected by a 
sprinkler system (per Table 40.2.6) and 300 feet in the business occupancy since it is sprinkler protected. 
When either code criteria are used (LSC or IBC), the travel distance requirement is met.  
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2.6 Horizontal exits 
There are no horizontal exits in the Fab. There is a two-hour complete fire separation between the north 
and south ends but neither side meets all the requirements of the LSC paragraph 7.2.4.  2.7 Fire Barriers and Enclosures 
See Figure A-1 for the location of fire barriers. Overall, there is a 2-hour barrier around the corridor 
separating the southern fabrication area from the rest of the facility. There is also a 4-hour rated wall 
separating 858N from 858EF. The 4-hour rated barrier is accomplished by two 3 hour rated doors. To the 
south there is a fire-resistant glass (Fire-Lite door) which has a 90-minute rating and separates 858N from 
858S. 858S has a combination of labs and offices. See Figure 15 for a picture of this door.  
 
Figure 15. 90-minute fire rated door separating 858N and 858S. 
Elsewhere around the facility there is a 2-hour fire rated barrier separating the HPM storage rooms with 
the utility/equipment space to the north and the business occupancy cluster of buildings to the west. The 
business cluster of offices is also separated by a two-hour rated wall with the utility space to its north. 2.8 Exit signs 
Requirements to properly post exit signs are included in both the IBC and LSC.  IBC paragraph 1006.1 
states, “The means of egress, including the exit discharge, shall be illuminated at all times the building 
space served by the means of egress is occupied.” (The exceptions that follow below this paragraph do 
not apply to the Fab.)  IBC paragraph 1011.1 also states, “Exits and exit access doors shall be marked by 
an approved exit sign readily visible from any direction of egress travel. The path of egress travel to exits 
and within exits shall be marked by readily visible exit signs to clearly indicate the direction of egress travel 
in cases where the exit or the path of egress travel is not immediately visible to the occupants. Intervening 
means of egress doors within exits shall be marked by exit signs. Exit sign placement shall be such that no 
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point in an exit access corridor or exit passageway is more than 100 feet or the listed viewing distance for 
the sign, whichever is less, from the nearest visible exit sign.” (The exceptions that follow below this 
paragraph do not apply to the Fab.)  Paragraph 1011.3 of the IBC goes on to further give the requirements 
for illumination of the exit signs, whether internally or externally illuminated.  
The LSC gives a basic requirement of marking the means of egress as well as it states in paragraph 
7.10.1.2.1, “Exits, other than main exterior exit doors that obviously and clearly are identifiable as exits, 
shall be marked by an approved sign that is readily visible from any direction of exit access.” Paragraph 
7.10 goes on to give even more specific requirements on the illumination and marking of exits. These 
requirements include the size of the text “No Exit” (that should be placed on doors which could be 
mistaken as leading to an exit) and the visual characterization requirements that a special sign (non-exit 
sign) needs to follow. 
In the Fab, exit marking is adequate. Figure 16 shows a typical exit sign on the first floor which is properly 
illuminated and clearly shows the direction of the exit (the left arrow on the sign). The basement also has 
egress path markings on the floor which help maintenance personnel because of the large size of the 
basement and the aisles formed from the large equipment spaces (see Figure 17). Figure A-7 shows the 
proposed exit signs in the first floor if they ever need to be reconstituted. 
 
Figure 16. Example of a typical exit sign on the first floor of the Fab. 
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Figure 17. Example of an exit path marking on the floor of the Fab basement. 2.9 Interior Finishes 
Because the Fab is a production type facility and not a typical SNL research facility, the number of posters, 
pictures, displays, etc. that might lead to interior finish issues with the LSC and IBC are not present in this 
facility like other SNL buildings. (858S has the majority of posters and displays of the SNL MESA complex 
achievements). Interior finish classifications are shared between the IBC and LSC. They are shown below.  
Class A: = Flame spread index 0-25; smoke-developed index 0-450.  
 
Class B: = Flame spread index 26-75; smoke-developed index 0-450.  
 
Class     C:        =         Flame         spread        index        76-200;      smoke-developed          index       0-450. 
The interior finish requirements are given in the LSC chapter 10 and the IBC in chapter 8. Table 803.9 of 
the IBC gives the requirements based on occupancy type. See Table 3 below. The occupancy groups in the 
FAB are marked in red text. 
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Table 3. Interior Finish Requirements from the IBC. (Abbreviated for the sake of brevity.) 
GROUP 
(OCCUPANCY)  
SPRINKLEREDl  NONSPRINKLERED  
Interior 
exit 
stairways 
Corridors  Rooms  Interior exit 
stairways 
Corridors  Rooms 
A-1 & A-2  B  B  C  A  Ad  Be  
A-3f , A-4, A-5  B  B  C  A  Ad  C  
B, E, M, R-1  B  C  C  A  B  C  
R-4  B  C  C  A  B  B  
F  C  C  C  B  C  C  
H  B  B  Cg  A  A  B  
I-1  B  C  C  A  B  B  
I-2  B  B  Bh, i  A  A  B  
I-3  A  Aj  C  A  A  B  
I-4  B  B  Bh, i  A  A  B  
R-2  C  C  C  B  B  C  
R-3  C  C  C  C  C  C  
S  C  C  C  B  B  C  
U  No restrictions  No restrictions 
 
Table A.10.2.2 of the LSC (in the annex but assembled from the enforceable parts of the code in the main 
section) similarly gives requirements for interior finishes based on occupancy classification as shown in 
Appendix A. 
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Table 4. Interior Finish Requirements from the Life Safety Code. 
 
All interior finish requirements are met currently in the Fab.  
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2.10 Prescriptive Requirement Summary 
In summary, the Fab presents unique egress challenges because of its high hazard contents (per the LSC), 
the fact that it is a semiconductor facility (see NFPA 318), and because it’s an H-5 occupancy (per the IBC). 
Also, because there are no true fire barriers between floors both the interstitial second floor as well as 
the basement are considered H-5 occupancies which means they also need to meet egress requirements 
for an H-5. Almost all egress requirements are met except for RM 1919 which does not meet requirements 
for a high hazard area. A second door may be added to the exterior to eliminate this deficiency as 
discussed in the conclusions and recommendations section of this report. Let’s now shift our discussion 
to the fire alarm systems of this facility.  3 Fire Alarm and Communication Systems  3.1 General Description 
The fire alarm system in the FAB is a Honeywell Notifier fire alarm system.  One fire alarm system is used 
for the entire 858 (MESA) complex. One of the reasons for installing one networked system in the entire 
facility is due to the unique nature of the MESA complex (several facilities physically connected) and 
because of the difficulties of evacuating people from the facility. The MESA complex is one of the few 
places on the Sandia New Mexico complex that has a Notifier system.  Any repairs on the system need a 
special contractor authorized to work on a Notifier system.  
There are two main panels for the Fab. One is located on the 1st floor (as pictured in Figure 18) and one is 
in the basement (as pictured in Figure 19).  The fire alarm system is also tied into several special smoke 
detection, suppression, and toxic gas shut down systems as outlined below: 
• Carbon dioxide suppression system for fabrication cleanrooms (Figure 20) 
• Fire cycle suppression system for chemical dispensing room (Figure 21) 
• Ultra-sensitive smoke detection (USSD) for sub fab spaces (below the floor) in cleanrooms (Figure 
22) 
• Toxic gas shutdown monitoring and shutdown equipment (Figure 23) 
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Figure 18. Picture of Notifier NFS-640 FACP (Nodes 1-2) 
 
Figure 19. Picture of Notifier NFS-640 FACP (Node 3) 
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Figure 20. Picture of Notifier 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 suppression control panel 
 
 
Figure 21. Viking Fire Cycle suppression release panel 
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Figure 22. Analaser USSD panels 
 
 
Figure 23. Toxic Gas monitoring and shutoff equipment 3.2 Location  
The main fire alarm control panel for the MESA complex is in 858EL which is located to the northeast of 
858 North. All alarm signals across the MESA complex are directed to this panel which has a radio 
transponder that transmits out all signals to Sandia’s proprietary receiving system which then transmits 
to the Kirtland AFB Fire Department for response.  There are two fire alarm control panels in the FAB 
specifically for that facility which is shown below.  They are located on the first floor and in the basement. 
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These FACPs transmits signals to the panel in 858EL. various specialty suppression and detection system 
panels on the first-floor tie into the main fire alarm system. Figure 24 shows a plan view of the main fire 
alarm system panel.  
 
 
Figure 24. FACP location shown by the red circle 3.3 Operating Characteristics 
The main reason for having a fire alarm control panel (FACP) in each of the four facilities in the MESA 
complex is to only evacuate occupants in the facility that has an alarm. For example, if there were an 
alarm in the FAB, 858 North, the FACP would only activate speakers and strobes that are in the FAB. 
Currently all facilities use a recorded fire alarm message, which plays through the speakers, to let 
personnel know to evacuate. The occupants of the attached facilities (858S, 858EL, and 858EF) would 
not even know about the alarm in 858N. The signal from the FAB would go to the transponder in 858EL 
which would then be sent to Sandia’s propriety receiving station, The Phoenix, and then go to the 
Kirtland Air Force Base fire department for response. Recall that the Sandia New Mexico complex is 
located on Kirtland Air Force Base. 
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Due to the nature of semi-conductor work, there are many sub-panels that the FACP at 858N ties into. 
These include USSD piping in the cleanrooms (which gives local alarms only at the least sensitive levels), 
a specialty system that uses heat detectors to cycle the sprinklers on/off, and  
CO2 suppression for the tools in the cleanroom.  Specialty toxic gas shutdown equipment is also connected 
to the fire alarm system and will slowly turn off the flow of toxic gases in the cleanroom upon receipt of 
any general alarm signal.  3.4 Fire Detection Devices 3.4.1 Types of Devices 
There are multiple fire detection devices located throughout the Fab. Table 5 gives a summary of them 
along with pictures where available. All fire alarm initiating devices are of the Notifier type to be 
compatible with the Notifier fire alarm control panel in 858N and the entire Notifier fire alarm network at 
the B858 (MESA) complex. Multiple modules are used in B858 to tie in signals from the specialty gas 
equipment in the facility. For example, a toxic gas alarm or hydrogen gas alarm is tied to the fire alarm 
system to issue a general fire alarm in the facility. Because the fire alarm system is an intelligent system 
with speakers (and not horns), emergency response is able to issue any specialty message they deem 
appropriate across not only 858N but also the other facilities in the 858 complex (858EL, 858EF, and 858 
S).  
The interaction between the gas detection and alarm equipment and fire alarm system is a key operational 
characteristic of the Fab and the MESA complex. There is a control room in the Fab where the toxic gas 
system can be managed by emergency personnel as far as which areas they would like to alert to a specific 
alarm condition. There are yellow (warning) and red (evacuation) beacons that this system uses in the 
FAB. These notification appliances are separate from the fire alarm system. Figure 25 shows the multiple 
pull stations available to an emergency manager to pull based on what event was occurring in the building.  
 
Figure 25. Multiple pull stations tied to the toxic gas detection and fire alarm systems. 
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Table 5. Initiating Devices present in the Fab. 
Type of Device  Manufacturer Brand Description Picture (typical) 
Heat Detector 
(Activate Suppression 
System) 
NOTIFIER, Model FST-
851, mounted on 
standard detector 
base B710LP 
Used to initiate the 
Fire Cycle Suppression 
system (Fixed temp 
type: 135℉ 
 
Pull Station  NOTIFIER, Model NBG-
12LX, dual-action 
addressable pull 
station 
Used as a manual 
actuated alarm-
initiating device 
 
Ultra - Sensitive 
Smoke Detection 
System (with multiple 
panels) 
Analaser type  Used to detect smoke 
in the  sub-Fab areas 
of the FAB (under 
floor). 
See Figure 23. 
Duct smoke detector  NOTIFIER, Intelligent 
InnovairFlex Duct 
Smoke Detector 
Housing Model DNR 
with FSP-851 
photoelectric smoke 
detector 
Located in air handling 
equipment where 
required by NFPA 90A 
 
(Housing only shown 
above.) 
Spot type smoke 
detector 
NOTIFIER Honeywell 
Fsp-851 Fire Alarm 
Intelligent 
Photoelectric Smoke 
Detector Sensor 
In elevator shafts and 
in high hazard 
chemical storage areas 
 
XP10-M NOTIFIER Monitor 
Module 
Connected to multiple 
zoned water flow 
alarms and hazardous 
gas flow alarms and 
signals from 858G 
(Warehouse) 
 
FMM-1 NOTIFER Monitor 
Module  
Connected to spec gas 
panel (Trouble and 
Alarm Signals) and the 
858N CO2 system 
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3.4.2 Location, Spacing and Placement of Devices 
As mentioned in section 4.5.1, there are a wide variety of initiating devices throughout Fab. Their location 
is tied to their purpose. For example, an ultra-sensitive smoke detection system is only needed in the 
under-floor area of the fab areas because that’s the only space that requires that sensitive of smoke 
detection (to ensure the clean room doesn’t have any contamination on the fabricated product.)  The 
reason that USSD is in the sub floor spaces of the cleanroom (opposed to above the ceiling) is that in the 
Fab cleanroom design the sub fab space is used as a return air plenum since air is directed upward into 
the fab areas from below and then goes through HEP filters in the ceiling before being directed back down 
towards the sub fab space. 
In a similar fashion, the reason for the heat detectors to be in the chemical dispensing rooms is to 
activate/deactivate the fire cycle system. A fire cycle system was installed in these rooms since it would 
be hazardous if the room becomes flooded with a mix of the chemical and water from a sprinkler 
operating. Therefore, the activation temperature of the heat detector is lower than that of the sprinklers 
in the room. This design allows for the water flow solenoid to be energized.  
All code provisions of where an initiating device is required, has been complied with. See below for a list 
of requirements (not meant to an exhaustive list, only a representative one): 
• IBC 2015 Section 404.4 – Fire Alarm System. A fire alarm system shall be provided in accordance 
with Section 907.2.14. The Fab meets this requirement. A fire alarm system which is required by 
having a high hazard facility has been provided. 
• IBC 2015 Section 907.4.1 – Protection of Fire Alarm Control Unit. In areas not continuously 
occupied, a single smoke detector shall be provided at the location of each fire alarm control unit, 
notification appliance circuit power extenders, and supervising station transmitting equipment.  
The Fab meets this requirement. A smoke detector is provided in each one of these areas. (NOTE: 
Duct smoke detectors are also provided where required by NFPA 90A.) 
• IBC 2012 Section 907.4.2.1 – Location. Manual fire alarm boxes shall be located not more than 5 
feet from the entrance to the exit. The Fab meets this requirement. The FAB has 32 pull stations 
in the locations required. (Note that NFPA 101 9.6.2.3 has the same requirement.) 
• NFPA 101 Paragraph 9.6.2.5 – Additional fire alarm boxes shall be located so that, on any given 
floor in any part of the building, no horizontal distance on that floor exceeding 200 ft shall need 
to be traversed to reach a manual fire alarm box. The Fab meets this requirement upon review.  
• NFPA 101 Paragraph 9.6.2.8 – Where a sprinkler system is provided where there is a fire alarm 
system, it shall be provided with an approved alarm initiation device that operates when the flow 
of water is equal or greater than that form a single automatic sprinkler. Each of the three Risers 
in the Fab have water flow switches with monitor modules which are connected to the fire alarm 
system. Upon any water flow condition, the fire alarm system sounds a general fire alarm 
throughout the facility.  
• NFPA 72 Chapter 18 spacing requirements for smoke and heat detectors: The Fab meets code.  
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3.5 Analysis of Fire Detector Response   3.5.1 Fire Scenario  The chosen fire scenario for this report is one that has been a pressing concern for the fire protection engineering department for quite some time. It involves a solvent waste capture system in the basement where users empty out a barrel of full solvent waste (byproducts from the semiconductor fabrication process) and replace it with an empty one. The concern is that in the past the users have left the drum exposed in the basement for days at a time. The sprinkler system in the basement is not designed to fight such a fire involving solvent waste as a fuel. There are also contradicting positions between codes on whether or not the flammable liquids are allowed to be stored below grade (in a basement). A rapidly progressing fire in the basement could also have enormous effects on the first floor since the first floor is not fire separated from the basement. Figure 26 shows the location of where the fire would start in the chosen scenario and Figure 27 shows a picture of the actual solvent waste capture system itself. Note that there are two solvent waste capture systems in the basement but only one was used in this scenario.   
  
Figure 26. Location of fire in east corridor of the basement 
Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab) 
 
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017   42 
 
   
Figure 27. Solvent waste capture system. 3.5.2 Fire Analysis 
 The fire occurs in the basement. The basement has a height of approximately 30 feet where sprinklers are located (per NFPA 13 they are within 1’ of the bottom of the first-floor slab). Sprinklers are placed approximately 15’ apart in accordance with NFPA 13 requirements. Fast response ordinary temperature sprinkler heads are used throughout the basement. A fire involving a bucket of solvent waste is considered ultrafast. Table 6 shows the DETACT model’s parameters.   
Table 6. Input parameters used in the DETACT model for the fire analysis. 
INPUT PARAMETERS 
Ceiling Height (H) 9.14 m 
Radial Distance (r) 3.2 m 
Ambient Temperature (To) 25 ℃ 
Activation Temperature (Td) 73.9 ℃ 
Response Time Index (RTI) 110 (m-s)1/2 
Fire Growth Power (n) 2 - 
Fire Growth Coefficient (α) 0.1876 kW/s^n 
Time Step 1 s 
Justification for the selected parameters is below: 
• Ceiling height is 30’ or 9.1 m 
• Maximum radial distance of the sprinkler is 15’ *0.7 = 10.5 ft = 3.2 m 
• An ambient temperature of 25 ℃  was used based on data from the Nuclear Regultaory 
Commission 
• The RTI used is 50 based on data from the manufacture’s cut sheet. 
• The sprinkler activation time used is 165 ℉ or 73.9 ℃ . 
• The fire growth coefficient used was for a “ultrafast” fire.   
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The equations given in Figure 28 were used in the DETACT model. The DETACT model results are shown 
in Figure 29. 
       
Figure 28. Equations from FPE 522 that were used in the DETACT model. 
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Figure 29. Output of the DETACT model showing activation at ~ 150 seconds  
As Figure 33 shows, the temperature inside the detector lags that of the gas temperature surrounding the 
detector. If the RTI was higher (over 50), then the sprinkler would be called a standard response sprinkler 
and the delay between the gas temperature and detector temperature reaching the activation 
temperature (as shown as the red line) would be more pronounced.  150 seconds, or a little under two 
minutes, is a quick activation time. However, the 5 MW heat release is very troubling given that 
maintenance workers could be in the basement and two minutes is not a lot of time to get out of the 
intimate fire area. More troubling is that if there were some type of failure with the sprinkler system, 
there is no fire rating to the first floor which has a lot more personnel and hazards than the basement.  
Based on the severity of the fire from the DETACT model, it is imperative that open drums of solvent waste 
never be left out for any period. The DETACT model ran did not give any indication, nor should it have, of 
when or if the fire would have been controlled by the nearby sprinklers. Given the expected ultra-fast 
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development of the fire, it’s likely the sprinkler system could not provide the necessary control to stop 
the fire from spreading out of control. Luckily, Sandia fire protection engineering has worked closely with 
the occupants in the FAB who own the solvent waste system to put administrative controls in place to 
never leave barrels of waste in the open. 3.6 Fire Alarm Transmission 
 3.6.1 Fire Alarm System Type  The fire alarm system at the Fab communicates to a proprietary supervising station at Sandia National Laboratories. The reason this station, called The Phoenix, is this type is that it is monitored by Sandia emergency operations, maintenance and fire protection engineering all of who have a financial stake, from a company perspective in the protected property.  The central station is monitored by a workstation in Sandia’s maintenance building. The manager of the Fire Protection maintenance department also has a monitor in his office that he watches throughout the day. Finally, the Kirtland Air Force Department receives the signals from The Phoenix at their Honeywell central receiving station.   3.6.2 Disposition of Signals 
 If an alarm is received at the Fab or any other Sandia building, then the Kirtland Air Force Base Fire Department will respond to the building and extinguish the fire as appropriate. If a trouble is received at the supervising station, then the fire protection maintenance manager will dispatch personnel to troubleshoot the system. If a supervisory signal is received then Sandia emergency operations will investigate and contact Sandia facilities if need-be. In the event of a non-fire alarm at the Fab, key management personnel will also be notified and coordinated with to avoid shutting down production or evacuating personnel if need-be. Of course, safety takes precedence, but as with any semiconductor fabrication downtime in the facility has an enormous effect on the mission and a variety of stakeholders.     3.7 Alarm Notification Appliances 
 3.7.1 Types of Appliances 
 
The standard notification appliance located throughout the Fab is a System Sensor SpectrAlert SP2 series 
wall speaker/multi-candela setting strobe appliances. There are variations to this notification appliance 
depending on where it’s located. In the clean rooms audible only devices are installed as not to interfere 
with the manufacturing process (which a strobe would do with its “harsh” light).  There are a couple strobe 
only devices located in the facility. These are in a hallway. It is not clear why these devices have no audio 
component for them since even the NAs in the restrooms have speakers. Speaker strobes are installed 
throughout the tour aisles (where occupants pass before and after they enter the clean room), mechanical 
rooms, conference rooms, basement, and 2nd floor.  There are no strobes or speakers in individual offices 
or storage rooms. 
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Figure 30. Standard notification appliance (speaker/strobe type) located throughout the facility. 
 3.7.2 Location, Spacing, and Placement of Appliances 
 Most of the occupied areas of the facility have coverage with a notification appliance. NFPA 72 makes it clear that it doesn’t dictate exactly where an appliance is located for audible and visual notification purposes. See the relevant excerpts below from NFPA 72:  
• 18.4.1.4.1 The designer of the audible notification system shall identify the rooms and spaces that will have audible notification and those where audible notification will not be provided. 
• 18.4.1.4.2 Unless otherwise specified or required by other sections of this Code, the required coverage area for visible occupant notification shall be as required by other governing laws, code, or standards.  Where the other governing laws, codes, or standards require audible occupant notification for all or part of an area or space, coverage shall only be required in occupiable areas as defined in 3.3.178 
• 18.4.1.4.3 The sound pressure levels that must be produced by the audible appliances in the coverage areas to meet the requirements of this Code shall be documented by the system designer during the planning and design of the notification system. The greater of the expected maximum sound pressure level having a duration of at least 60 seconds shall also be documented for the coverage area by the system designer to ensure compliance with 18.4.3,18.4.4,18.4.5, or 18.4.6 for the coverage area.  
• 3.3.178 Occupiable Area. An area of a facility occupied by people on a regular basis.  
• 18.5.2.1 The designer of the visible notification system shall document the rooms and spaces that will have visible notification and those where visible notification will not be provided. 
• 18.5.2.2 Unless otherwise specified or required by other sections of this Code, the required coverage area for visible occupant notification shall be as required by other governing laws, code, or standards.   Based on the review of the fire alarm drawings, the Fab is code compliant with the location of notification appliances. Sandia National Laboratories does not require individual audible or visual notification appliances in individual offices.  It also does not require them in storage rooms. Sandia does require notification appliances (both visual and audible) in conference rooms and Figure 31 shows that it is provided for in the Fab. Acceptance testing was performed for the facility. It was documented that the sound pressure levels of the appliances did not exceed 110 dbA (per NFPA 72 18.4.1.2) and that they were 15dbA higher than commonly accepted values of ambient noise levels throughout the facility (for business space, lab space, etc.). NFPA 72 paragraphs 18.4.8.1, 18.5.5.1, 
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and 18.5.5.2 cover the mounting installation requirements for notification appliances. One of these key requirements is to install wall mounted notification appliances such that entire lens is not less than 80 in. and not greater than 96 in. above the finished floor. The Fab has a fire protection assessment every three years (which will become an annual assessment in the near future) and there are no open findings for any deficiencies related to the fire alarm design and installation.   
 
Figure 31. Example of Notification Appliance layout in the office area. 
 3.8 Emergency Communication Systems (ECS) 3.8.1 Type of ECS  The FAB has a combined fire alarm and emergency communications system. Since the notification appliances use speakers instead of horns, recorded or live voice messages can be broadcast throughout the facility. Each of the main fire alarm panels throughout the MESA complex also are combined FA/ECS panels and each have a microphone that can be used to send messages through the fire alarm speakers. Figure 32 shows the location of the microphone provided in the main fire alarm control panel for the Fab.  Having an emergency communications system is not standard for Sandia National Laboratories but the MESA complex has one due to the unique hazards present and increased need to give specific instructions to personnel based on the location and type of emergency.  
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Figure 32. Combined FA/ECS panel. Note the microphone for emergency communications.    3.8.2 Operating Characteristics and Capabilities  Unlike the mass notification systems required by the Department of Defense (see UFC 4-021-01), the ECS at the Fab is not intended to be operated by building occupants.  There are no local operating consoles (remote microphone stations) provided in the Fab that are required in DoD facilities. The only operators of the system at the FAB should be designated Sandia Emergency Response personnel or the Kirtland Fire Department (KFD) although the KFD would probably defer to Sandia’s EOC to operate the system and make an announcement. The only pre-recorded message for the system currently is the fire alarm message although this system has the capability for 32 minutes of standard quality (4 minutes at high quality) digital audio. Specific emergency response plans have been made for the Fab which likely include scenarios where the ECS would be operated.  
Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab) 
 
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017   49 
 
3.9 Power Requirements 
 3.9.1 Secondary Power Type 
 Secondary power is provided for the Fab fire alarm system via batteries located underneath the panel. Batteries are also provided for the CO2 system releasing panel and the Fire Cycle system control panel. The design of the batteries follows the requirements in NFPA 72 paragraph 10.6.7.2.1 which states the secondary power supply must have the power capacity for 24 hours of standby operation and 5 minutes of operation in alarm mode.  Sandia does not require a more stringent requirement (like the 72 hours of standby time required for DoD facilities). Sandia uses lead-acid batteries and has the batteries routinely changed out by the fire alarm maintenance crew if the battery is more than 4 years old.  
 3.9.2 Adequacy of Secondary Power 
 By looking at the fire alarm system database, I was able to determine the quantity of devices and NACs in the Fab. I was then able to look at manufacturer cut sheets to determine the required secondary power capacity. Using the requirements of NFPA 72 10.6.7.2.1, I determined the required amp-hours of the secondary power supply is approximately 16.5. The provided secondary supply capacity for the Fab fire alarm system is 25 A-H so the secondary power is adequate. Table 7 shows the results of the calculations. 
 
Table 7. Secondary Power Calculations 
Item Standby 
Current 
per Unit 
(A) 
  Number 
of Units  
Total 
Standby 
Current 
Alarm 
Current 
per Unit 
(A) 
  Number 
of Units  
Total 
Alarm 
Current 
FACU 0.189 X 1 0.189 0.231 X 1 0.231 
Smoke 
Detectors 
0.000045 X 30 0.00135 0.018 X 30 0.54 
Pull 
Stations  
0.00025 X 32 0.008 0.0004 X 32 0.0128 
NAC #1 0.043 X 1 0.043 0.135 X 1 0.135 
NAC #2 0.043 X 1 0.043 0.135 X 1 0.135 
NAC #3 0.043 X 1 0.043 0.135 X 1 0.135 
Heat 
Detectors  
0.000045 X 3 0.000135 0.018 X 3 0.054 
Monitor 
Modules 
0.000045 X 45 0.002025 0.000045 X 45 0.002025 
Control 
Modules  
0.001 X 50 0.05 0.001 X 50 0.05 
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Duct 
Smoke 
Detecors   
0.000045 X 9 0.000405 0.018 X 9 0.162 
Relays  0.000045 X 26 0.189 0.000045 X 26 0.00117 
      SUM: 0.568915     SUM: 1.457995 
Standby 
Current 
(Amps) 
Time 
factor 
(hours) 
Standby 
Current 
(Ahs) 
Alarm 
Current 
(Amps) 
Time 
factor 
(hours) 
Alarm 
Current 
(Ahs) 
Total 
Current 
(Ahs) 
Safety 
Factor 
(20%) 
Required 
AH batt. 
0.568915 24 13.65396 1.457995 0.08 0.12 13.78 2.76 16.53 
  3.10 Fire Alarm Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance (ITM) 
 3.10.1 Inspection and Testing 
 Sandia has their own in-house fire protection maintenance crew. This crew is divided up into three crafts: fire sprinkler, fire alarm, and fire extinguisher.  The fire alarm crew handles all inspection, testing, and maintenance (ITM) for Sandia’s fire alarm systems. Sandia building occupants can submit service requests for anything they notice wrong on the system. For example, a blocked strobe or audible warning not loud enough during a fire drill. In this fashion, the occupants are the daily basic inspection check for the system. For testing, each fire alarm system is commissioned in conjunction with the fire protection engineering department to ensure the systems meet code and function as designed before being accepted. For testing as part of maintenance requirements, please see the next section. 
 3.10.2 Preventive Maintenance  The Sandia fire alarm maintenance team performs a yearly preventive maintenance (PM) on each building that has a fire alarm system. This PM checklist has been made by fire protection engineering to incorporate all the ITM requirements from NFPA 72. Once completed these PMs then go to a Sandia fire protection engineer for review. If there are any discrepancies or follow-up repairs needed, the Sandia FPE makes sure that work gets done in a prioritized manner. By the time the next annual PM occurs, all follow up actions and repairs from the previous year should be complete. Figure 33 shows a typical PM checklist that the maintenance craft have filled out.  
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Figure 33. A typical annual Sandia fire alarm ITM checklist 3.10.3 Summary 
In conclusion, the fire alarm system at the Fab is very robust and is integrated into the MESA complex 
system.  It is also integrated into gas safety systems that the SNL 858 line organizations own. The 
complexity of the system is required based on the unique hazards of an H-5 semiconductor facility.  Since 
the system interacts with various other SNL facility systems, it requires a high degree of maintenance 
which is performed on a routine basis by SNL maintenance. The next section will discuss the sprinkler 
systems in the Fab. 4 Sprinkler Systems in the Fab 
 4.1 General Overview  
Types of Water Based Fire Suppression Systems in the facility: 
1.) A wet-pipe sprinkler Riser was installed in 1987 and is in the northern part of the facility protecting 
the northern half of the facility. This sprinkler will herein be called Riser 1. 
2.) A wet-pipe sprinkler Riser was installed in 1987 and is located in the southern part of the facility 
protecting the southern fabrication area. This sprinkler will herein be called Riser 2. 
3.) A pre-action “fire cycle” Riser protects a shed type area which is part of the facility. The system is 
able to cycle on and off depending on whether heat detectors serving the area are in alarm. This 
sprinkler will herein be called Riser 3. 
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Figure 34 shows a schematic of each Riser as originally designed. Note the varied complexity of each Riser, 
especially the “central plant” Riser which is Riser #3. 
 
Figure 34. Three Riser schematics of the Fab. 
There are no standpipe systems in the facility as this is a two-story building with a basement and not a 
large enough building that might require a standpipe for the Fire Department to properly fight a fire in 
the facility.  
Sprinkler Riser “Profiles” 
Figures 35 thru 37 are sprinkler Riser “profiles” which show the location of the three Risers in 858N and 
what areas of the facility they are protecting. Riser # 1 is in the north-east (NE) corner of the 1st floor and 
protects the non-fabrication north side of the 1st floor along with a small portion of rooms on the 2nd floor. 
Riser # 2 is in the west side of the basement and protects the basement along with the southern portion 
of the 1st floor which is the semi-conductor fabrication or “fab” area. Riser # 3 is in the west side of the 1st 
floor and is fed off of Riser #1 by a 4” line. It solely protects the chemical dispersing area rooms which are 
located against the FAB.  
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The Riser profiles also show that there are two post indicator valves (PIVs) and two fire department 
connections (FDCs) for the FAB. One PIV and FDC is for Riser #1 and one FDC and PIV is for Riser #2. A 
separate FDC and PIV is not needed for Riser #3 because it is fed from the same fire demand line as Riser 
#1. The FDCs are double-Siamese type with 2.5” standard size outlets.  
 
Figure 35. Riser “profile” for the 1st floor of the Fab. 
 
Figure 36. Riser “profile” for the 2nd floor of the Fab. 
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Figure 37. Riser “profile” for the basement of the Fab. 
 
 4.2 Sprinkler types  
Most of the sprinkler heads in the Fab are the original ordinary temperature rated heads that were 
originally installed with the facility in the late 1980s. The sprinkler heads in the clean rooms (southern 
portion of the first floor) were replaced in 1999 with quick response rated ordinary temperature rated 
heads. These sprinkler heads were changed out as part of a larger Sandia National Laboratories’ effort to 
change out recalled Omega brand sprinkler heads. More detailed information about the sprinkler head 
models was not available at the time of this report.  4.3 Design Requirements 
Riser 1: 
Riser 1 protects mainly lab space except for a few offices in the northern part of the facility. The offices 
are classified as light hazard spaces per NFPA 13 while the rest of the space would be classified as a 
Ordinary Hazard (Group II) Occupancy. Figures 38 through 40 shows an analysis of the appropriate hazard 
classifications per NFPA 13 (2013 edition). Note the Riser profiles previously discussed shows which 
sprinkler systems would protect which hazard areas. Riser #1 has a hydraulically most demanding design 
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area of 0.2 gpm/ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 over a design area of 1500 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 per NFPA 13. (Note that the design criteria of NFPA 
318 is not used because there are no clean rooms protected by Riser #1. ) 
 
Figure 38. Proposed NFPA 13 occupancy classification for the 1st floor of the Fab. 
 
Figure 39. Proposed NFPA 13 occupancy classification for the 2nd floor of the Fab. 
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Figure 40. Proposed NFPA 13 occupancy classification for the basement of the Fab. 
Figure 41 below shows design densities for the various spaces protected as analyzed by a sprinkler 
contractor during their analysis. Note that the values below represent the original design values of the 
FAB from when it constructed in the late 1980s. Also note that the design densities differ slightly from 
NFPA 13 densities because Sandia National Laboratories sprinkler densities were used.  
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Figure 41. Original design densities for Riser #1 of the Fab. 
Note that the original column line distinctions that the Tables are based on above was not available upon 
the time this report was issued. However, it can be clearly seen that the densities were broken out 
between multiple areas of the facility. The same basic densities (0.2,0.17,0.14 gpm/square foot) are used 
throughout the calculations though. Again, this has more to do with Sandia lab’s sprinkler density 
specifications for different room types (i.e. lab, office, mechanical code) than it has to do with different 
NFPA occupancy classes.  
Riser 2:  Density of 0.2 gpm/ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2  in accordance with NFPA 318 (PROTECTION OF SEMICONDUCTOR 
FABRICATION FACILITIES) 2015 edition paragraph 11.1.4.2. over a design area of 3000𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2. Note that this 
density is equivalent to an Ordinary Hazard (Group 2) facility in NFPA 13 (Figure 11.3.2.1.1) as shown in 
Figure 42. The hose demand is 250 gpm over a period of 90 minutes (per NFPA 13 Table 11.2.3.1.2) for an 
ordinary hazard group 2 facility. Note that 90 minutes was used for the water duration even though a 
range is given in the Table (see Figure 43) because per paragraph 11.2.3.1.3 the lower durations shall be 
used when the water alarm is electronically supervised in a constantly attended location.  
 
Figure 42. NFPA 13 density/area method chart 
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Figure 43. NFPA 13 Hose Demand and Water Supply Selection Table. 
As discussed with Riser 1, below are more of the original design calculations. These calculations however 
are all for areas sprinkler protected by Riser 2.  
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Figure 44. Original design densities for Riser #2 
Riser 3:  
The pre-action system protects two rooms with chemical dispensing equipment. The appropriate density 
requirement if 0.3 gpm/ 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 square foot over the entire square footage area of the rooms since they are 
less than 2500 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 (specified by Figure 44) and are the only areas protected by the Riser. 4.4 Water Supply Data 
80 psi static pressure 
74 psi residual pressure at 1,359 gpm  
Test was performed at a hydrant located NE of building 858N. 
Flow data is based on a flow test from 2005 which is not recent enough to use for actual design purposes 
but will be used for this report. 4.5 Water Supply Description 
The sprinkler systems in the FAB are fed from a main waterline network which runs throughout the New 
Mexico Sandia labs campus and serves the rest of Kirtland Air Force Base (KAFB).  This waterline also 
connects to the city of Albuquerque water supply at three different points. The main waterline serves 
both the fire demand lines for sprinkler systems as well as the domestic water lines for plumbing 
throughout both Sandia and KAFB facilities. For this reason, each fire sprinkler system on the Sandia 
campus is mandated to have a backflow preventer installed to prevent cross-contamination. The FAB has 
two backflow preventers installed: one on the line serving Risers #1 and #3 and one on the line serving 
Riser #2. 
KAFB has three main water tanks supporting fire suppression systems. The tank sizes are 500,000, and 
750,000 and 500,000 gallons respectively. The Fab is in tech area I (one) of Sandia National Laboratories 
which is the area of the Sandia campus which has the most developed water line system because of the 
high number of facilities in the area and population of building occupants. There are numerous fire 
hydrants around the Fab as shown in Figure 45. NFPA 24 paragraph 7.2.1 states that hydrants shall be 
provided and spaced in accordance with the requirements of the authority having jurisdiction. SNL uses a 
minimum distance of 100’ to the FDC, and other hydrants being located within 300’ of any location in the 
building.  
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Figure 46 shows the main water lines around the Fab. There is a 10” ductile iron line to the North of the 
MESA complex from which the line for Riser #1 eventually branches off into.  The 8” line for Riser #2 
branches off from a 12” main located to the west of the MESA complex. Riser #3 is fed off the same 8” 
fire demand line as Riser #1. 
 
Figure 45. Fire hydrants around the 858 complex. The flow hydrant used for test data is circled. 
 
Figure 46. Water lines (shown in blue) surrounding the Fab. Red circles indicate fire demand lines. 
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4.6 System Layouts 
There are two main Risers covering the FAB, Risers #1 and #2. Riser #3 only covers two small rooms 
adjacent to the buildings. Figures 47 thru 49 illustrate the master sprinkler layouts throughout the Fab. 
Note that a large portion of the 2nd floor is an open area with a mezzanine overlooking it.  
 
Figure 47. Master Fire Protection Plan for the 1st floor. 
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Figure 48. Master Fire Protection Plan for the 2nd floor. (Note that CAD arch file was not available.) 
 
Figure 49. Sprinkler layout in the basement. 
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Riser 1: As shown in Figure 50, Riser 1 is an 8” Riser which leads to a 4” cross main connecting to 1.5” and 
2” branch lines. Riser # 1 is a gridded system on the first floor which means that the branch lines connect 
back to other cross mains. A gridded system improves the hydraulic performance since the sprinkler has 
two distinct paths from which to receive water from.  
 
Figure 50. Sprinkler layout near Riser #1. 
 
Riser 2: Riser #2 is also a gridded system. It rises from the basement and protects the fabrication area on 
the 1st floor. There is a four-way seismic brace where it rises to the first floor as shown on Figure 51. 
 
Figure 51. Piping from Riser #2 as it enters the 1st floor. Note the four-way seismic brace. 
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Riser 3: Riser #3 is a 6” Riser and as previously indicated only protects two rooms (8 total sprinkler heads). 
Figure 52 illustrates the location of the protected rooms and the riser, which on the sprinkler plan, is 
actually only represented as a control valve.  
 
Figure 52. Riser #3: The white circle is area of coverage and the red circle indicates the control valve. 4.7 Sprinkler Inspection, Testing, and Maintenance Requirements 
NFPA 25 (2015 edition) is the governing code for fire suppression system testing requirements for this 
discussion. At Sandia National Laboratories, the ITM requirements of fire protection systems has been 
automated into a software program called Maximo which creates work orders for maintenance staff to 
perform work in the field.  These work orders are referred to as PM checklists which stand for preventative 
maintenance checklists. These PMs (for short) are divided into four per year, each of which incorporates 
requirements from NFPA 25. There are two quarterly PMs, a semiannual PM, and an annual PM per year. 
The NFPA 25 semi-annual requirements are placed on that PM (such as verifying that a water flow signal 
from the inspector’s test is received at the fire alarm control panel), the quarterly NFPA 25 requirements 
on that PM (such as visual inspection of alarm devices), and the annual NFPA 25 requirements on that PM 
(visual inspection of sprinkler heads).  
Figure 53 shows the B858N PM checklists at SNL which includes quarterly, semi-annual, and annual 
requirements (this checklist was for an annual sprinkler PM).  
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Figure 53. Examples of the sprinkler ITM. 4.8 Summary and Water Supply/Demand Curve 
The Fab has various sprinkler systems in the facility and some unique design features (e.g. the fire cycle 
system). Figure 54 shows the water supply/demand curve for the sprinkler systems in the facility. It uses 
the most hydraulically demanding design data from Figure 44 and the water supply data from Section 
4.4. In this figure, the demand data is represented by the red line and the supply data is represented by 
the green line. Note that even if 85% of the available water supply was used for the design (as specified 
by SNL in the sprinkler design specification), the facility should have an adequate water supply.  4.9 Sprinkler System Summary 
Like the fire alarm systems in the Fab, the sprinkler systems in the Fab are quite complex. There is an 
extensive amount of control valves for different areas and one of the systems is a specialty Fire Cycle 
system due to the hazard it protects. The systems are adequate based on the original design due to the 
SNL sprinkler specification at that time. However, the recommendation would be to re-calculate the 
systems to the current NFPA 13 and NFPA 30 requirement to check if the current code would be met. 
Based on the hazards of the facility this check would be a good practice and could prompt re-design of 
the systems as the facility itself is regularly being modified to meet mission needs. The next section 
discusses the Fire Safety program of the Fab.  
 
Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab) 
 
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017   67 
 
 
Figure 54. Water Supply/Demand Curve 5 Fire Safety Program 5.1 Evacuation Plan Requirements 
The Fab is required to have an approved fire safety and facility plan per IFC Section 403.7 since the Fab is 
a Class H Occupancy. Since the Fab is a semiconductor facility (Group H-5 Occupancy), it is also required 
to comply with IFC sections 403.7.1.1 through 403.7.1.4. These sections include the following 
requirements: 
• Plans and diagrams shall be maintained in approved locations indicating the approximate plan for 
each area.  
• Plans and diagrams shall indicate the amount and type of HPM stored, handled, and used, 
locations of shutoff valves for supply piping, emergency telephone locations and locations of exits. 
(HPM is a semiconductor facility term for Hazardous Production Materials.) 
• Plans and diagrams shall be maintained up to date and the fire code official and fire department 
shall be informed of major changes.  
• Responsible persons shall be designated as on-site emergency response team and trained to be 
liaison personnel for the fire department. 
• Emergency drills of the on-site emergency response team shall be conducted on a regular basis 
but not less than once every three months. Records of drills conducted shall be maintained.  
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A sample of an evacuation plan from the Fab is shown in Appendix B. Note that each floor of the Fab (First, 
Second, and Basement) have an evacuation plan but only the main first floor one is shown below for 
clarity.  
In addition to the evacuation plans, personnel working inside the Fab are trained to know what different 
colored manual pull stations do in the facility. For example, there are the normal red colored pull stations 
for the fire alarm system (spaced per NFPA 72), but there are also pull stations specific to HPMS and other 
hazards in a semiconductor facility. See figure 55 for descriptions of each type of pull station. (Note that 
these excerpts come directly from a safety brochure distributed to the facility workforce). 
 
  
  
 
 
  
 
 
 
  
 
 
Figure 55. Different Pull Stations in the Fab. 
Sandia national labs use evacuation teams (“evac teams”) that are organized per facility or complex (a 
small collection of facilities) for building occupants to leave. These teams are designed to get occupants 
out of the facility in an organized manner as the fire department is traveling for fire alarm response. Each 
evacuation team has a team captain who has final responsibility with making sure the team swept all their 
assigned areas of the facility before evacuating. 
The Fab has an even more detailed level of evacuation based on which pull station is actuated (see above). 
For example, if a yellow pull station is pulled the occupants will evacuate in a more delayed manner (e.g. 
securing equipment that they normally wouldn’t in an emergency). If a blue station is pulled, then 
emergency responders will only go to the location where it was pulled (e.g. the tour aisle). Lots of training 
and practice has gone into the Fab to make sure emergency personnel and the evacuation team performs 
as appropriate during an actual building emergency. The 858 (MESA) complex also has a Mass Notification 
Pull Stations 
Fire Alarm Pull Station: 
• When activated, the affected building must 
evacuate. Maximum Foreseeable Loss doors 
will automatically close separating 858N from 
858EF. 
  Yellow Pull Station: 
• Yellow pull stations will evacuate fab 
zones in a Non-emergency manner. 
These pull stations will alert the 
Emergency Response Team. 
Blue Pull Station: 
• Blue pull stations are for personnel 
who need immediate assistance in 
the tour aisle. These pull stations 
will alert the Emergency Response 
Team. 
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System (MNS) that emergency responders can use to direct the personnel to take the appropriate action 
as they direct depending on the emergency (e.g. full evacuation, shelter-in-place, etc.) 5.2 Emergency Notification 
Members of Sandia’s workforce are trained to call 911 in the case of an emergency. On the Sandia 
location, this number routes to Sandia’s emergency response team (ERT). The emergency response unit 
accompanies the KAFB Fire Department on all fire alarms. The reason this is done is partly due to security 
concerns and also due to the Sandia ERT being more familiar with some of the unique hazards in a Sandia 
facility.  
Sandia uses tone alert radios (TARs) to alert occupants throughout the site of emergency situations such 
as an active shooter, extreme weather, etc.  This system is separate from the fire alarm system but can 
be used for evacuation in the same manner.  The TARs may be used to give specific building occupants 
instructions to shelter-in-place or to shut down hazardous operations or secure classified material. There 
are multiple buildings at Sandia which do not have evacuation plans (since they do not require one per 
the IFC). Therefore, having TARs enables the emergency responders or security forces to assist in the 
evacuation of facility occupants in lieu of an organized evacuation plan.  5.3 Fire Fighting by Occupants 
Every Sandia employee is required to take some form of basic safety training every year that tells them 
what to do in the case of an emergency. Some members of the workforce (MOW) are required to take 
Fire Extinguisher training if they work in a lab with an open flame, perform hot work, etc. These employees 
take hands-on training on how to use a fire extinguisher but are only trained to fight a fire if they feel 
comfortable doing so and if the fire is in the incipient phase. All other MOW are trained to evacuate the 
building unless they feel the need to use an extinguisher for their personal safety.  5.4 Summary 
The Fab is a complicated facility from a fire safety/emergency evacuation system due to it being physically 
connected to three other facilities and the unique hazards from the semiconductor operations. Occupants 
are specifically trained to recognize different alarms, know the difference between different colored pull 
stations, listen to instructions on radios and the complex’s mass notification system, how to shut down 
their current operations if need-be due to alarm, and where to evacuate the building in an organized 
manner.  Drills are an important part of making sure the Fab would be prepared for an emergency. The 
next topic is the structural analysis of the Fab.  6 Structural Analysis 6.1 Overview 
The Fab is double-tee pre-cast panel construction. The floors of the Fab are not considered fire separated 
since there are multiple penetrations and gaps between the floors.  As mentioned in the egress section, 
this is the reason why the basement and 2nd floor are Group H-5 occupancies. The roof is a flat roof 
constructed of a steel deck with insulation and a membrane covering. This arrangement is considered a 
FM Type I roofing system.  
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6.2 IBC Analysis  
The Fab is primarily classified as an “H-5” occupancy due to it primarily being a semiconductor fabrication 
facility which is defined as an H-5 occupancy under the 2015 International Building Code (IBC), paragraph 
307.7. To determine what the maximum allowable building height and area are per the IBC, we can consult 
Chapter 5, “General Building Heights and Areas”, and the tables contained herein. Tables 504.3 and 504.4 
give the allowable building height in feet above grade plane and the allowable number of stories above 
grade plane, respectively, as shown in Table 8.  Also, considered into account is the type of construction 
used for the Fab which is Type II-B. Values for the Fab, a sprinklered Group H-5 occupancy are circled. 
Note that per the code of record, the 1985 Uniform Building Code (UBC), the type of construction is Type 
II-N (“N” stood for non-rated) which was replaced in later versions of the code by the Type II-B designation.  
The 858 complex has numerous barriers between the different facilities composing the complex. For 
example, there exists a 4-hour maximum foreseeable loss (MFL) barrier between 858/North and 858/EF. 
The MFL requirement comes from the Department of Energy (DOE) criteria and not any IBC or NFPA 
requirements. The purpose of an MFL barrier is to separate the facilities in the case of a major loss due to 
fire in one of the facilities such that it won’t affect the other complex facilities. For purposes of fire 
protection and life safety, the entire 858 complex needs to be considered but that is beyond the scope of 
this report.  
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Table 8. International Building Code Criteria for Allowable Building Height and Number of Stories  
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Looking at the values for the Fab, the Fab meets the prescriptive code requirements. This is because the 
Fab is only 28 feet tall which is well below the 55 feet allowed in Table 504.3. Also, there are only 2 stories 
above grade in the Fab which is not more than the 3 stories allowed per Table 504.4. We can now consider 
the allowable area for the Fab. To start that discussion, let’s look at section 506.2.3 from the IBC below 
and the subsequent equation for determining the allowable area. See figure 56 for the excerpt.  
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Figure 56. Allowable Area for Building per the IBC. 
Our next step is to consider 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 which we calculate from Equation 5-5 from IBC section 506.3.3 as shown 
below. However, since the Fab is not adjacent to a public way as it is in a gated area, there is no 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 .  See 
figure 57 below for the IBC excerpt pertaining to this factor.  
 
Figure 57. Formula for Amount of Area Increase per the IBC. 
Since the actual area of the Fab includes various occupancies, we can calculate the total area of the 
main three occupancy groups (B, H-5, and H-3). Since there is no part of the building that fronts a public 
way, we will set 𝐼𝐼𝑓𝑓 as zero.  
𝐻𝐻 − 5:  𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 = 69,000 ∗ 2 = 138,000 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 > 64,340  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)  
𝐻𝐻 − 3:  𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 = 14,000 ∗ 2 = 28,000 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 > 2,788  𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)  
𝐵𝐵:  𝐴𝐴𝑎𝑎 = 𝐴𝐴𝑡𝑡 ∗ 𝑆𝑆𝑎𝑎 = 69,000 ∗ 2 = 138,000 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 > 65,490 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2 (𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎)  
Therefore, as shown above all the requirements for the allowed area for the various occupancies in the 
Fab are met. Table 9 shows the construction requirements for the fire ratings of various structural 
elements of the building. All the requirements in the Type II-B facility are met for the Fab.  
Culminating Project Report (858/N Fab) 
 
Prepared by Daniel Garcia, June 2017   74 
 
 
 
Table 9. IBC Table 601 
 6.3 Summary 
The Fab is compliant with the code of record’s structural analysis. It is a Type II-B constructed building 
with multiple fire barriers and a double fire wall between 858/North and 858/EF. This fire wall is a 
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Maximum Foreseeable Loss (MFL) wall per DOE requirements. The next section discusses the smoke 
control analysis at the Fab.  
 7 Smoke Control Analysis 
There is continuous operation of the fume exhaust in the facility and there are no atriums in the facility. 
Additionally, a fire alarm will stop the flow of all production gases as well as shut down the HVAC systems 
in the facility. Therefore, per IBC requirements, a smoke control system is not required. There is smoke 
detection in the return air system for the fabrication area. Smoke and heat vents are required by IBC 415.6 
when the area of a H-1,H-2, or H-3 occupancy is greater than 15,000𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2. In the Fab, the area of the H-3 
chemical storage area is approximately 7,954 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓2  which is below the IBC threshold. Finally, per IBC 
415.11.1.6 mechanical exhaust ventilation not less than 1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓3 𝑚𝑚�  is required in the fabrication area where 
HPMs are used or stored. This ventilation is provided in the Fab. In conclusion, all smoke control 
requirements are met by the Fab. The next section discusses a performance based approach to egress, in 
accordance to the SFPE Handbook, at the Fab.  8 Performance Based Approach to Egress 8.1 Occupant Characteristics 
The Fab is a “24/5” facility which means it operates 24 hours a day, 5 days a week. Occupants are almost 
all employees assigned to the facility. The exception are cases such as an inspector (e.g. SNL fire protection 
or Facilities) or someone being given a tour of the area but in both of those examples it is required that 
the person be escorted by someone who knows the layout of the facility. Additionally, SNL has a “take 
your child to work” day once a year so during this day it may be possible that someone who is not that 
familiar with the layout of the building might be escorting their child around the facility.  
In general, the occupants/employees are assumed to be mostly able-bodied. The primary use of the 
facility is for semiconductor (wafer) fabrication which generally requires persons with normal use of their 
body to function intently and carefully in their operations or else the quality of the wafers and 
components may not be acceptable. The offices are generally for occupants who also are active in the 
facility (e.g. not managers who sit at their desk all day meaning that they would likely be able bodied as 
well). Additionally, because of the low occupant rate on the second floor, which is mostly storage space, 
and the fact that the basement is only occupied under a maintenance or construction function, it is 
assumed that only a low percentage of occupants, less than 5%, might require assisted evacuation in the 
case of fire. Requiring assisted evacuation would likely be due to some underlying health condition, caused 
by the stress of an emergency, or confusion on the proper exit procedures (since the facility use is much 
more complicated than a simple office building). For example, a new employee might be unsure if an 
alarm is real and may wait much longer to leave a cleanroom if they are right in the middle of a delicate 
manufacturing procedure with various chemicals and gases.  
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8.2 Pre-Movement Time 
Occupants are actively working in the facility which implies they will be highly responsive to an alarm. A 
fire alarm is not the only possible alarm in the facility. In fact, users are trained to recognize the difference 
between a fire alarm and various other local or building wide alarms that would trigger an evacuation. For 
example, there are separate non-fire strobes for non-fire alarms with their own dedicated pull stations, 
one for a local alarm, and one for a building wide evacuation. For a non-fire alarm, it is conceivable that 
an occupant would need time to gather their belongings or stop the work their doing, especially in the 
cleanrooms when they are working with small quantities of hazardous materials. However, for a fire alarm 
the occupants are instructed to immediately evacuate regardless of whether they are working in a clean 
room and are gowned.  Therefore, it is expected that the pre-movement time for this facility will be 
approximately two minutes for a non-fire alarm and about 10 seconds for a fire alarm. Because non-
fire scenarios are beyond the scope of this report, a pre-movement time of 10 seconds will be used for 
future calculations.  8.3 SFPE Hydraulic Calculation Model  
Section 3, Chapter 13 of the SFPE handbook employs a hydraulic like model to estimate the evacuation 
time of a building. This model essentially treats occupants as particles of water flowing. It allows an 
engineer or interested party to get a rough idea about how long it would take to evacuate or “dump” a 
building. It is solely dependent on the design and construction of the facility (door widths, number of exits, 
exit layout etc.) and therefore its limitation is that it does not factor in human behavior such as occupants 
who are not as able-bodied as others or abnormal human behavior in a panic situation (such as people 
pushing each other out of the way to exit). For the purposes of this building, the model is a reasonable 
approach since occupants are trained on evacuation on different alarms and are expected to behave well 
in an emergency. Below are assumptions specific to this facility used for model calculations: 
• The Fab has numerous available exits to occupants. Therefore, it is not clear how to choose which 
exits occupants would take. A reasonable approach taken is that there is an emergency event 
requiring the entire building to evacuate. Because of how the facility is separated into a northern 
business/utility section and a southern fabrication area, it is expected that people in the northern 
half of the building would use the northern exits and people in the southern half would use the 
southern exits. There is also a 2-hour fire barrier separating north and south so it would not make 
sense for an occupant to want to cross it in the case of an emergency unless they had no choice. 
• The stair is in the center of the facility. Therefore, it is not expected that merging flows (2nd floor 
occupants traveling down and 1st floor occupants traveling up) would occur. The SFPE handbook 
has a specific equation for merging flows (equation 6 of Section 3, Chapter 13) but that is for cases 
where the exit discharges near the exterior of a facility and it possible to have people coming 
down from the upper floors while first floor occupants are exiting the building.  
• All exit doors have a nominal width of 44”. A walkthrough of the facility where a select sampling 
of doors was measured as 44” wide is the basis of this assumption. 
While many possible exit scenarios exist in a building with as many exits and complex operations like the 
Fab, one reasonable one was picked for the analysis. The situation is as follows: 
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• An emergency requires the building to evacuate. The fabrication area is at its maximum occupant 
load. Half of the occupants of the southern part of the facility (recall it’s separated from the 
northern part by a 2-hour fire barrier) exit through the 4 emergency exits shown in Figure 58. The 
locations of these exits on a floor plan are shown below. The 4 doors at the bottom of the clouded 
area are the 4 emergency exits.  
• Any occupants exiting the facility from the second floor will use the exits in the corridor on the 
other side of the North/South 2- hour fire barrier. 
 
Figure 58. Location of where half of the fab area occupants are assumed to be during calculation 
 
Since half of the occupants of the industrial general use are exiting that means the number of occupants 
is as follows: 317 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖2 = 158.5 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎 159 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖 
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It is anticipated that queuing will occur. Therefore, the maximum specific flow value of a door in Table 3-
13.5 will be used in Equation 8 of SFPE Section 3, Chapter 13. A boundary layer of 6” on both interior sides 
of the emergency exit (as shown in SFPE Figure 3-13.6) will be used. 
𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝐹𝐹𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 = 4(44𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 12𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) � 1 𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓12 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖��24 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑓𝑓𝑓𝑓�
� = 256 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎
 
It is assumed of the 159 occupants in the area marked on Figure 58, a quarter would go to each of the 
doors (evenly distribute themselves). Therefore, for one door in the area, the evacuation time would be  
𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒 = 0.25 ∗ 159 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖256 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎� = 0.15 𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎 ∗ 60 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 9 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
When the pre-movement time is added to this value, the time to evacuation becomes approximately 20 
seconds. Overall this low evacuation time can be expected because of the numerous emergency exits that 
the facility has. The governing time to evacuate will be the pre-movement time in the fabrication area 
when occupants must safely stop work, asses what type of alarm they hear and what the appropriate 
response is, and then begin to move.  8.4 General Tenability Conditions 
While the occupants of the building in the fabrication area are using hazardous chemicals in their work, 
the amount is minimal and the materials are mostly confined to the clean room “tools”. NFPA 318 gives 
an excellent discussion of this in their annex section. Because of the closely regulated use of hazardous 
materials, it is not expected that those materials would cause an additional hazard to the tenability of the 
facility.  There is also a 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 (carbon dioxide) suppression system in each clean room tool which helps to 
mitigate concerns from occupants being exposed directly to the hazardous materials in their tool. Each 
cleanroom even has a pull station that occupants could pull to activate their local 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 discharge. The 
cleanroom doors always open from the inside as well which would alleviate concerns from occupants 
being trapped in a confined space with an excess of 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2. 
Smoke is the largest concern for the facility since smoke has an effect not only on an occupant’s vision 
and respiratory health but also their speed to evacuate in an emergency. The SFPE handbook has excellent 
data showing the dramatic affect that even a small amount of smoke has on walking speed. Tenability 
thresholds of 120 degrees Celsius temperature and a heat flux of 2.5 kW/m have also been established 
for able-bodied persons through research into this field. For smoke obscuration, a requirement to see 
though smoke at 30 meters is typically used. All these performance factors could be used for a 
performance based approach to the Fab. An advantage of the layout of the Fab to a performance based 
design is that because of the numerous exits of the facility, reaching untenable levels for an occupant 
would be difficult. Tenability is discussed further in the fire modeling section of this report.  8.5 Pathfinder Model 
An evacuation model was made for the first floor Fab using the Pathfinder software which is made by 
Thunderhead Engineering. It is assumed that the first floor will be most critical when it comes to egress 
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since the second floor is essentially an interstitial area and the basement is usually scarcely occupied and 
is mostly space for equipment supporting the functions of the facility.  The model as shown in Figure 59 
was created by tracing a footprint of the first floor and rooms in the program and then also adding doors 
(shown in green and orange) based on the floor plans.  
 
Figure 59. Pathfinder model of the first floor of the Fab. 
The occupant load per the LSC was used to approximately place the occupants. Some of these rooms are 
not expected to have nearly as many people during actual use. For example, the mechanical room is a 
very large area in the northeast area of the floor but it is usually scarcely occupied only by workers 
performing maintenance. In the Pathfinder model, however it had a lot of people in it per the allowable 
occupant load. In the model, there was a clear bottle neck at the northeast exit from the tour aisle 
(fabrication area) as shown in Figure 60. Note that the chemical storage area directly north to where the 
occupants were exited had its doors removed in the model because those doors are access controlled 
only and few occupants have the key to it. Additionally, the area is considered more hazardous than the 
tour aisle so per the IBC, occupants should not be counted on to exit through there. 
 
See 
Figure 
60 
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Figure 60. Bottleneck near the chemical storage room. The lines indicate paths of travel.  
Overall, the exit time of the model was approximately 79 seconds as shown in Figure 61. Together with 
the 10 second pre-movement time, the overall required egress time would be approximately 90 seconds 
or a minute and a half. 
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Figure 61. Pathfinder Exit Graph (Occupants Exiting The First Floor of the Fab) 8.6 Summary 
In conclusion, both the SFPE hydraulic model and the Thunderhead Engineering Pathfinder model was 
used to analyze the egress capabilities of the Fab.  Heavy queuing was observed near the chemical storage 
room. However, the overall egress time was a minute and a half even with the pre-movement time added. 
The next section will address a performance based fire modeling analysis in accordance with the Life 
Safety Code.  9 Performance Based Fire Modeling 9.1 Performance Based Approach 
NFPA 101, the Life Safety Code (LSC), gives 8 design fire scenarios to use for a performance based 
approach to fire protection, opposed to the prescriptive based requirements given in the rest of the code. 
LSC paragraph 5.2.2 states that each design fire shall be realistic to at least one of the following scenario 
specifications: initial fire location, early rate of growth in fire severity, and smoke generation. For the fire 
modeling chosen in the report, the initial fire location was selected as the main specification but every 
reasonable effort was also made to capture the early rate of growth of the fire and smoke generation 
through the model parameters and the research conduction on which heat release rate (HRR) to use. 
LSC fire scenario 2 was chosen for the modeling case. This scenario describes an ultra-fast developing fire 
in the primary means of egress with interior doors open at the start of the fire. This scenario is also 
supposed to address concern of a reduction in the available means of egress. While all characteristics 
were not able to be met for the chosen scenario (the fire modeled was a medium growth fire), it did 
address the concern of a reduction in the available means of egress. Furthermore, the scenario was used 
to explore how fast the tenable conditions deteriorated in a means of egress. 
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For the performance based scenario, tenability conditions were chosen for a means of egress. Section 8.4 
addressed general tenability conditions for this facility but for the fire scenario people in the egress path 
were considered and the criteria considered was more conservative. Table 10 shows the chosen tenability 
criteria which arose from two sources: The Society of Fire Protection Engineers (SFPE) Handbook, and the 
Handbook of Smoke Control Engineering (HSCE).   
 
Table 10. Tenability Criteria for Performance Based Fire Modeling 
Tenability Criterion Threshold for pass/fail Literature Source of Criterion 
Temperature  < 66℃ to pass HSCE Figure 6.1 
Carbon Monoxide (CO) Production < 1,400 𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑚𝑚 to pass HSCE 
Visibility through Smoke Produced > 4 𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖  to pass SFPE Table 61.3 (familiar occupants) 
 
For visibility, the criterion for familiar occupants was used because, as stated previously, the Fab is a 
control access facility and occupants need specialized training to work there unescorted. If they don’t 
have the access they must have an escort who is familiar with the layout of the facility and exit locations. 
66℃ was chosen as the tenability criteria for temperature because in dry air that temperature should be 
tolerable per experimental research. That means that a person should be able to adequately move and 
egress quickly away from the heat and smoke of the modeled fire.  9.2 Fire Scenario 
There is a concern with lab coat gowning attire currently in the tour aisle of the fab area. Figure 62 shows 
the lab coats in this area. This arrangement is considered temporary until a new gowning area is 
constructed which is planned for the near future. However, this current configuration presents a fire 
hazard for one of the main paths to the exits of the facility. Note that there are two locations in this area 
where gowning attire is present. The attire includes lab coats which are mostly polyester and plastic bins 
with lab shoe covers, gloves, and hairnets.  
  
Figure 62. Gowning attire in the tour aisle (corridor) of the Fab. 
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The main fire scenario selected for this building is that one of the lab coat locations catches on fire due to 
a contractor’s hand-held power tool malfunctioning and serving as an ignition source. This is plausible as 
there is a lot of ongoing construction as part of the SSiFR project (see egress section) and a contractor 
could be checking their tool as they are preparing to gown themselves. Additionally, 55 gallon drums of 
materials (HF acid) is routinely moved through the corridor which presents an additional hazard. Figure 
63 shows a possible fire location and the path of the acid as it travels through the facility.  
 
  
Figure 63. Fire scenario and the path of the acid being moved through the corridor. 9.3 Fire Model 
To model this scenario, the PyroSim software (by Thunderhead engineering) was used. An existing CAD 
layout of the building was used to model the building in PyroSim. Figure 64 shows the model. Every room 
was modeled of the facility except a small portion to the right which was not included because the CAD 
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file didn’t originally include it as historically this portion of the building had been considered a part of the 
other fab in the MESA complex which is 858/EF. The actual height of the first floor was measured so that 
it could be placed in the model as the height of the walls.  
 
Figure 64. PyroSim model of the Fab’s first floor 
The corridor of the facility was modeled for a fire. There are six sprinkler heads in the short corridor shown 
in Figure 65. It is assumed that the doors are closed during the fire which is the normal operational 
procedure.  A fire in this area would impact the egress in that corner of that building as occupants located 
to the west and to the south would have to find another means of egress and would be exposed to the 
toxic gases from smoke if they were to open the doors (either to the west or the south).  
To better understand the role of sprinklers in the corridor during the fire, two scenarios were run. One 
scenario was with sprinklers and one was without. It was anticipated from the nature of sprinkler 
protection that tenability criteria would improve with the presence of sprinklers. However more precise 
data was desired and specifically whether some tenability criterion would pass with sprinklers but not 
without them. 
As previously stated in this report, there is a large degree of construction work occurring in the Fab and 
there is a potential concern that during construction (like that shown in Figure 66), the sprinkler system 
would be impaired unintentionally while hot work was occurring. Note that SNL does have a policy against 
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hot work occurring while a sprinkler system is impaired. However, for the sake of analyzing a plausible 
“worst-case scenario” the no-sprinklers situation was included in the modeling efforts.  
 
Figure 65. PyroSim model of the fire in the corridor of the facility. 
 
Figure 66. Construction activities occurring in the Fab near location of the fire scenario. 
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Research was conducted to find an adequate heat release rate (HRR) of a lab coat rack like that shown in 
Figure 67. The closest approximation found was from a report entitled, “Characterizing of Design Fires for 
Clothing Stores” by Zalok and Hadjisphocleous  (Zalok & Hadjisophocleous, 2007). These researchers 
tested several fuel packages made to simulate those found at a typical clothing store. They included 
pictures of their test configurations as well as measured HRR curves. Their experiment for shirts on a coat 
rack was used as the basis of the design fire. Figures 67 and 68 shows both the test configuration and the 
HRR curve respectively.  The authors noted that the HRR curve resembles a medium T-squared fire curve. 
Figure 67. Fuel package that was used for testing in Zalok & Hadjisphocleous paper 
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Figure 68. Test data from paper. “Test C” is the cloth test shown in figure 64. 
To model the actual effect of a sprinkler on a fire, the model with sprinklers was run first and then the 
HRR was capped at the time of the first sprinkler activation (noted at 188 seconds). This HRR curve is 
shown in Figure 69.  It was observed from multiple model runs that if this was not done, then the presence 
of sprinklers was purely cosmetic as it didn’t have any actual effect on the fire. Note that a curve 
resembling “Test C” in Figure 68 was used for the non-sprinkler model run.  
Note that Figure 65 shows a three-dimensional fire since it can clearly be seen from Figure 67 that a lab 
coat fire would emit heat from all dimensions and not from one dimension as a typical PyroSim burner 
would do. The surface area of all the sides of the block shown in Figure 65 were used to accurately 
compute the total HRR of the model runs which was approximately 550 kW for the sprinkler run and 
approximately 1400 kW for the non-sprinklered run.  
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Figure 69. HRR of the burning coat rack with sprinklers controlling the fire 9.4 Modeling Results 
Table 11 shows the sprinkler activation times for the model run involving sprinklers. The location of the 
sprinklers (1-6) were given previously in Figure 65. As one would expect, the sprinklers located closer to 
the fire were the first ones to activate.  
Table 11. Sprinkler Activation Times 
Sprinkler ID in Fire Model Activation Time (Seconds) 
SPRK05 187.6  
SPRK06 189.2 
SPRK04 208.4 
SPRK03 224.3 
SPRK02 237.8 
SPRK01 263.7 
 
Figures 70 through 72 show the results of the non-sprinklered corridor model run for the tenability criteria 
previously described: temperature, CO production, and visibility at the walking surface level of 6 feet. 
Figures 73 through 75 show the same results for the sprinklered corridor model run. 
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Figure 70. Temperature Slice File for Non-Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface. 
(Note that Temperature@ 360 seconds ≈ 𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐℃ >> 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔℃) 
Figure 71. CO Production Slice File for Non-Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface. 
(Note that CO production= 10,000 ppm@ 501 seconds  >> 𝟏𝟏,𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑) 
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Figure 72. Visibility Slice File for Non-Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface. 
(Note that Visibility ≈ 𝟐𝟐 𝒑𝒑𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 @ 114 seconds at 6 feet walking surface) 
 
Figure 73. Temperature Slice File for Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface. 
(Note that Temperature@ 294 seconds ≈ 𝟏𝟏𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐℃ >> 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔℃) 
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Figure 74. CO Production Slice File for Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface. 
(Note that CO production= 1,500 ppm@ 523 seconds  >> 𝟏𝟏,𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑) 
 
 
Figure 75. Visibility Slice File for Sprinklered Fire Scenario at 6 ft walking surface. 
(Note that Visibility ≈ 𝟐𝟐 𝒑𝒑𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 @ 125 seconds at 6 feet walking surface) 
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Table 12 shows a summary of the fire model results. Because of the size of the fire and the small corridor 
length, all the criteria fail miserably (except for CO production for scenario 2). The closest that either 
model run comes to passing the tenability criteria is the CO production for the sprinklered case which was 
1,500 ppm and very close to the 1,400 ppm threshold established. Since the doors of the corridor are 
typically closed, it is safe to assume that a lab coat fire would quickly overwhelm the integrity of egress of 
the corridor and essentially shut off the main exit for the north east portion of the fabrication area.  
Table 12. Tenability Criteria Results from Fire Models 
Tenability Criteria (at 6 ft.) Scenario 1 (Without Sprinklers) Scenario 2 (With Sprinklers) 
Temperature under 𝟔𝟔𝟔𝟔℃ 270℃ 
 
170℃ 
 
CO Production under 
𝟏𝟏,𝟒𝟒𝟐𝟐𝟐𝟐 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 10,000 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 1,500 𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑𝒑 
Visibility greater than 4 meters 0 meters 0 meters 
 
Perhaps even more alarming than the tenability criteria failing is how fast the smoke layer descends in the 
corridor. Figure 76 shows a graph of the smoke layer height vs. time for the sprinkler case model run. It 
can be clearly seen that the smoke layer descends to 1.8 meters (6 ft.) in less than two minutes (90 
seconds). Six feet as previously noted is considered the walking level. Therefore, the smoke starts to 
impair visibility in a corridor very quickly even for the best case where sprinklers activate. The effect of 
smoke on visibility is even more striking when looking in the corridor during the model run as Figures 77-
80 show. These figures were created by using the “viewpoint” feature in PyroSim/SmokeView. Note that 
the green ball in the model is the layer device used to produce the smoke height curve from Figure 76. 
 
Figure 76. Smoke Layer Height Descent Curve 
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Figure 77. 0 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers. 
 
 
Figure 78. 50 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers. Note slight smoke. 
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Figure 79. 60 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers. Note heavy smoke. 
 
 
Figure 80. 105 seconds into fire simulation with sprinklers. Note zero visibility. 
Results from Chapter 8 and the Required Safe Egress Time (RSET) as determined show an RSET of 90 
seconds. The ASET was approximated as 70 seconds. Therefore, the visibility decreases below the 
tenability criteria in an Available Safe Egress Time (ASET) less than the RSET. This can clearly be seen in 
figures 77-80 from an occupant’s point of view if they were in the corridor when the fire occurred.  
𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 + 𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 80 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 10 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 90 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 
Where 𝑓𝑓𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑡𝑡 = 𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎 𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑎𝑎 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹 (𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑓𝑓ℎ𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎) 
𝑓𝑓𝑝𝑝𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑒−𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑚𝑡𝑡 = 𝐷𝐷𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎 𝑓𝑓𝑜𝑜 𝑚𝑚𝑜𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑎𝑎𝑚𝑚𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓 𝑜𝑜𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝑁𝑁𝐹𝐹𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴 𝐻𝐻𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝐹𝐹𝑜𝑜𝑜𝑜𝐻𝐻 𝑅𝑅𝑎𝑎𝐹𝐹𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎 4.2.1 
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(Note that this value was taken for a mid-rise office building since no data exited for a facility like the Fab. 
It’s expected that the delay in egress of an office building would be like that of a Fab. As mentioned 
previously, occupants are trained to immediately start exiting the Fab upon notification of a fire alarm.) 
𝐴𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 ~ 70 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝑅𝑅𝑆𝑆𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅 = 90 𝑖𝑖𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑜𝑜𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∴ 𝐹𝐹𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎 𝐶𝐶𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑢𝑢𝑎𝑎𝑖𝑖! 10 Conclusion and Recommendations  
In conclusion, the Fab is a very complicated and intricate facility which was designed and built specifically 
for semiconductor operations. It incorporates best practices and specialty code requirements (such as 
from NFPA 318) that aren’t seen in a typical industrial lab facility. It is also a part of a complex which 
consists of four main facilities and various small support rooms/buildings such as a warehouse and utility 
building. Being part of a complex primarily effects the egress and fire alarm systems in the Fab. With 
respect to the fire alarm system, the Fab has its own building fire alarm system which is then tied into a 
complex wide system. With concerns to egress, there are various fire barriers and fire walls connecting 
the different facilities. The most robust of them is a double fire wall between 858/North and 858/EF (the 
two manufacturing portions of the complex). 
Fire Safety in the Fab is heavily incorporated into other facilities and operational systems. For example, 
each clean room tool has carbon dioxide fire suppression built into it.  There are also the various alarms 
throughout the facility besides only fire alarm. For example, there are toxic gas alarms and general alert 
signals that can be triggered by safety personnel and building occupants.  
Wet pipe fire suppression is the main source of fire protection in the facility. There are three wet pipe 
risers in the building. Also provided is carbon dioxide protection of the clean room tools. All systems are 
regularly maintained per code by either Sandia Labs maintenance or an outside contractor. High sensitivity 
smoke detection is provided in some areas and maintained by an outside contractor.  
Table 13 shows the main conclusions and recommendations of this report. The most pressing issue of the 
gowning equipment in the corridor. At the close of this report, construction of the gowning area is 
complete and this fire scenario will be eliminated once all gowns are moved from the corridor into its new 
dedicated space. This move is expected to take place in the near (short) timeframe as of the time of this 
report.  
Moving acids and other chemicals is an issue that is currently being discussed for the facility. The problem 
is that the building was built to the 1985 UBC which didn’t have the same restrictions on moving chemicals 
as what’s in NFPA 318 today. Additionally, the facility was originally constructed as an H-6 space (now 
called H-5 by the IBC) with the sole exception of the chemical storage area which was considered an H-2 
space. More work will have to be done to lower the risk of HPMs affecting egress beyond reason. 
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Table 13. Recommendation Table Based on Report Analysis 
Recommendation Reason 
Add an exit to the exterior to RM 1919 RM 1919 falls under the high hazard provisions of 
NFPA 101 and doesn’t meet NFPA requirements 
for NFPA high hazard content requirements 
Perform new flow test. NFPA mandates that flow test must be within 5 
years of any design initiated for the sprinkler 
system. Current flow test data is too old. 
Reconstitute hydraulic calculations  Original hydraulic calculations are not available 
and design densities don’t match current NFPA 
sprinkler criteria for flammable liquid storage 
(NFPA 30) or a semiconductor facility (NFPA 318) 
Move gowning operations from the corridors to 
a dedicated space 
Fire modeling shows that a lab coat fire in the 
corridor will severely affect the ability of that area 
to serve as an egress path.  
Minimize the movement of acid through an 
egress corridor during the times the building is 
normally occupied.  
An acid spill would hinder egress through the 
corridor. It would also hamper emergency 
response if there was a fire occurring at the same 
time.  
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   Appendix A. Egress Related Analysis 
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Figure 81. A-1. Fire Rated separations on the first floor. 
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Figure 82. A-2. Fire Rated separations on the second floor. 
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Figure 83.  A-3. Fire Rated separations in the basement. 
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Color Code Occupancy Class Total Number of Occupants 
Green Group B 39 
Pink Group S-1 13 
Orange  Group H-3 49 
Blue Group H-5 238 
 
Total Number of Occupants on the floor. : 339 
 
Figure 84. A-4. Occupancy Group Classification for the First Floor.  
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Color Code Occupancy Total Occupants 
Blue Group H-5 18 
 
Figure 85. A-5. Occupancy Group Classification for the Second Floor.  
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Color Code Occupancy Total Occupants 
Blue Group H-5 329 
 
Figure 86. A-6. Occupancy Group Classification for the Basement.  
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Table 14. A-1. Occupant Load Calculations for the First Floor 
Room 
Number 
Room Name Square 
Footage 
Occupancy Use Occupancy 
Load Factor 
(ft^2/occupant) 
Occupant 
Load 
(Fractional) 
Occupant 
Load 
(People) 
1505 Metrology 
Chase 
262.1 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.31 2 
1506 Metology Bay 563.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.82 4 
1507 Photlith 3/4 
Chase 
384.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.92 3 
1508 Photolith 3 Bay 454.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.27 3 
1509 Photolith 2/3 
Chase 
337.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.69 3 
1510 Photlith 2 Bay 526.7 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.63 4 
1511 Photlith 1/2 
Chase 
470.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.35 3 
1512 Photlith 1 Bay 401.1 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.01 3 
1513 Photlith 1 
Chase  
338.7 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.69 3 
1514 Etch 6 Bay 315.9 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.58 3 
1603 Ion Implant 
Chase 
1134.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 5.67 7 
1604 MEMS 
Etch/Endura 3 
Chase 
1210.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 6.05 7 
1605 Metrology/Etch 
7 Chase 
434.9 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.17 3 
1606 Etch 7 Bay 202.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.01 2 
1607 Etch 7/E.A. 1 
Chase 
494.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.47 3 
1608 Eng. Ana. 1 Bay 449.9 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.25 3 
1609 Lot Start - P 
Test Chase 
244.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.22 2 
1610 Inspection Bay 449.7 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.25 3 
1611 HDP/CVD 
Chase 
448 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.24 3 
1612 CVD/Metals 
Bay 
232.5 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.16 2 
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1613 Metalization 2 
Chase 
535.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.68 4 
1614 
 
160.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.80 2 
1615 
 
246.5 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.23 2 
1616 
 
1059.3 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 5.30 6 
1616A 
 
67.3 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.34 1 
1617 Restroom  844.8 Business Areas 100 8.45 9 
1618 
 
67.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.34 1 
1621 
 
855.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 4.28 5 
1700 Service  2584.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 12.92 14 
1701 
 
306 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.53 3 
1702 Diffusion 2 Bay 307.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.54 3 
1703 Diffusion 1/2 
Chase 
562 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.81 4 
1704 Diffusion 1 Bay 341.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.71 3 
1705 Etch 3 EA 2 
Chase 
379.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.90 3 
1706 EA 2 Diff 1 Bay 348.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.74 3 
1707 Engineering 
Analysis 2 
287.9 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.44 2 
1708 Etch 3 Bay 332 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.66 3 
1709 Etch 2/3 Chase 405 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.03 3 
1710 Etch 2 Bay 386.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.93 3 
1711 Etch 1/2 Chase 244.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.22 2 
1712 Etch 1 Bay 395.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.98 3 
1713 Photo 5 Chase 298.3 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.49 2 
1714 CMP1 Bay 261.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.31 2 
1715 CMP Chase 2085.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 10.43 11 
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1715A 
 
145.9 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.73 2 
1801 Diffusion 2 CVD 
1 Chase 
187.4 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.94 2 
1802 CVD 1 331.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.66 3 
1803 CVD 1/2 Chase 242.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.21 2 
1804 CVD Bay 283.5 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.42 2 
1805 CVD Flex 1 
Chase 
144.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.72 2 
1806 Etch 4 Bay 403.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.02 3 
1807 Etch 4 Chase 459.9 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.30 3 
1808 Chemical Pass-
thru 
136.5 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.68 2 
1808A 
 
179.8 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.90 2 
1809 Etch 5 Chase 468 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.34 3 
1810 Etch 5 Bay 639.5 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 3.20 4 
1811 Etch 
5/Metalization 
1 Chase 
585.5 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 2.93 4 
1812 Metalilzation 1 
Bay 
276.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.38 2 
1813 Metalilzation 1 
Chase 
640 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 3.20 4 
1814 
 
238.1 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.19 2 
1815 
 
245.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.23 2 
1815A 
 
145.3 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.73 2 
1817 
 
730.3 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 3.65 5 
1819 
 
827.6 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 4.14 5 
1821 
 
1307.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 6.54 8 
1902 
 
977.3 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 4.89 6 
1904 
 
299.5 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.50 2 
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1905 
 
158 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.79 2 
1905A 
 
141.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 0.71 2 
1906 Loading Dock  1187.1 S-1 Storage 300 3.96 5 
1906-A 
 
66 S-1 Storage 300 0.22 1 
1906-B 
 
66 S-1 Storage 300 0.22 1 
1906-C 
 
66 S-1 Storage 300 0.22 1 
1906-D 
 
63 S-1 Storage 300 0.21 1 
1910 Material 
Control  
665.4 S-1 Storage 300 2.22 3 
1914 
 
726.2 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 3.63 5 
1919 Exhaust Fan 
Room 
1436.1 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 7.18 8 
1920 DI Water Room 4109.4 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 20.55 22 
1922 Mechanical 
Room  
11373 Group U 300 37.91 39 
1926 
 
446.4 Business Areas 100 4.46 5 
1928A 
 
189.3 Business Areas 100 1.89 3 
1928B 
 
189.3 Business Areas 100 1.89 3 
1930-A 
 
129.3 Business Areas 100 1.29 2 
1930-B 
 
129.3 Business Areas 100 1.29 2 
1930-C 
 
139.6 Business Areas 100 1.40 2 
1930-D 
 
139.6 Business Areas 100 1.40 2 
1931 
 
164.4 Business Areas 100 1.64 3 
1931-A u88 123.2 Business Areas 100 1.23 2 
1931-B 
 
123.2 Business Areas 100 1.23 2 
1931-C 
 
87.9 Business Areas 100 0.88 2 
1932 
 
339.1 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.70 3 
1946 Acid Storage  417.5 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 2.09 3 
1950 Alkali Storage  484.5 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 2.42 3 
1954 Hirsch Room 317.7 H-5 Manuf & 
Process 
200 1.59 3 
1958 Flammable 
Storage  
431.2 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 2.16 3 
1964 Chemical 
Storage  
933 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 4.67 6 
1980 Sodium 
Hydroxide 
250 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 1.25 2 
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1981 Sulfuric Acid  250 H-3 Hazardous 
Storage 
200 1.25 2 
 
Total Square 
Footage: 
57694.7 
  
Total 
Occupant 
Load: 
374 
 
 
Occupant Load Calculations for the Second Floor: 
  Room Description Room Number  Square Footage Occupancy Occupancy Load Factor (ft^2/occupant) Occupant Load (Fractional) Occupant Load (People) General Storage 200 472 H-5 Manuf & Process 200  2.36 3 General Storage 201 548 H-5 Manuf & Process 200 2.74 4 General Storage 202 346 H-5 Manuf & Process 500 1.73 3 General Storage 203 582 H-5 Manuf & Process 200 2.91 4 Shop 204 197 H-5 Manuf & Process 200 0.985 2 General Lab 205 344 H-5 Manuf & Process 200 1.72 3  
Total 
Occupied 
Area (2nd 
floor): 
2489 
  
Total 
Occupant 
Load (2nd 
Floor): 
19 
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Figure 87. A-7. Exit Sign Markings (Proposed if design needs to be reconstituted.) 
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Figure 88. A-8. Exits provided for the facility. Green circles represent exits to the exterior and blue circles indicate exits to the 
other facilities in the MESA complex. 
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 Appendix B. Sample Evacuation Plan 
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Figure 89. B-1. Fab Basement Emergency Equipment and Evacuation Plan 
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Figure 90. B-2. Safety and Warning Equipment in Fabrication Area. 
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